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ABSTRACT
La survivance has traditionally played a central role 
in Quebec politics, and while the international relations of 
Quebec can be viewed as part of this general historical pat­
tern, it is also a particular response to modern technolo­
gical conditions. Indeed, it is primarily because of these 
latter conditions that international relations has become 
somewhat of a cultural imperative for Quebec. Moreover, given 
the changes in its political and governmental processes, it 
was logically inevitable that Quebec should seek to establish 
such transnational relations. In attempting to conduct these 
relations, however, Quebec has posed several serious problems 
for the federal government.
One purpose of this thesis is to examine, in the light 
of cultural theory, the historical and present attempts by 
Quebec to ensure the integrity of the French Canadian 
cultural-national community. This examination reveals impor- 
tant changes over time s firstly, prime responsibility for 
cultural-national preservation has shifted from the Church to 
the State; secondly, there has occurred, in the post-war 
period, a redefinition of the means and ends of la survivance; 
thirdly, both previous changes were prompted by modern tech­
nological developments.
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine the in­
ternational relations of Quebec. Quebec's governmental pro­
cess has reflected the post-war redefinition which favoured
- iii -
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policies of extroversion. The international relations of 
Quebec is part of that reflection. In terms of federal- 
provincial relations, it is also part of Quebec’s attempt to 
ensure maximum autonomy in areas of provincial jurisdiction. 
However, the constitutional and political problems which 
arise from Quebec’s international relations are so grave, 
and so fundamental to the Canadian federal system, that solu­
tions to them have not yet been found.
By demonstrating an essential and logical relationship 
between Quebec's international relations and the preservation 
and development of its cultural-national community, this 
thesis endeavours to explain why, in spite of the politico- 
constitutional stalemate, Quebec continues to conduct 
transnational relations.
IV
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PREFACE
The patriotic enthusiasm which marked Canada's centenary
was tempered, by a serious reassessment of national values and
goals. Providing a dramatic impetus for that reassessment was
the warning of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, that,
...Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, 
is passing through the greatest crisis in its history... 
...a time when decisions must be taken and developments 
must occur leading either to its break-up, or to a new 
set of conditions for its future existence...(Prelimi­
nary Report, p. 13 and 133).
The solution to problems of majority-minority rights, of deux 
nations, of associate-state and special-status concepts, and 
of constitutional review, necessitated an examination and 
understanding of the aspirations and politics of Québécois. 
Thus, since the mid-1960's, much has been written on the 
politics of Quebec. The reassessment in both English- and 
French-speaking Canada continues.
This particular study was undertaken in light of that 
continuing national reassessment. Hopefully, it will contri­
bute to the growing body of literature on the politics of 
Quebec, and thereby further the understanding by English 
Canadians of their French-speaking confrères. Only by such 
repeated and reciprocal attempts at understanding will the 
chances for Canada's future and harmonious existence prevail.
In the preparation of this work, much valuable
V
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INTRODUCTION
Preservation of the French Canadian cultural-national 
community has always played a predominant role in the 
politics of Quebec. It lies near the heart of every issue. 
University grants, fiscal autonomy, linguistic rights can 
all be traced, in the final analysis, to a cultural root. 
Particularly in federal-provincial, Ottawa-Quebec relations, 
issues are more often than not cast in English-French, 
majority-minority terms.
The international relations of Quebec, while a rela­
tively recent and controversial phenomenon, is part of this 
long-standing pattern. Indeed, not only is it part of that 
pattern but, given the circumstances within and outside 
contemporary Quebec, it is an essential element. Further­
more, in light of this essential relationship between 
cultural-national preservation and the international rela­
tions of Quebec, the latter*s emergence as a problem-issue 
was logical, if not inevitable.
Within Quebec, the state has gradually assumed a more 
active and positive role. Its assumption of cultural re­
sponsibilities, formerly vested exclusively in the Church, 
was accompanied by the post-war redefinition of the means 
and ends of cultural-national survival (la survivance), a 
redefinition whereby the Church's traditional, defensive
-  1 -
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policies involving isolation were rejected in favour of a 
decisively extroverted and secular approach. Moreover, 
within the present atmosphere favouring intervention, the 
state is determined to exercise fully its legislative and 
administrative responsibilities as defined by the British 
North America Act.
However, changes within Quebec have occurred simulta­
neously with those of its global environment. Penetrative 
communications, a result of modern technology, have opened 
Quebec to the numerically overwhelming, English-speaking 
North American community. Assimilative pressures are there­
fore brought to bear. Yet these networks of communication 
have, in turn, facilitated Quebec contacts with other 
francophone societies.
Technology has also effected a change in both the 
conduct and the content of international relations t the 
presence of informal international actors has markedly in­
creased; likewise, the treatment of issues of general 
social welfare - which in Canada fall largely within pro­
vincial jurisdiction - is much more frequent.
From the standpoint of cultural theory, the combination 
and interaction of these internal and external circumstances 
seem to make international relations a necessity for 
Quebec's cultural-national survival. Theories of culture 
suggest that the maintenance and healthy development of any 
cultural-national community necessitate an equilibrium 
between the forces of stability and the forces of non-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
assimilative change. The endogenous temporal, and the dif­
fusive spacial, transmissions of culture are therefore 
equally imperative. By the mid-1960*s, Quebec had effective­
ly institutionalized the temporal transmission of culture 
when it created the Department of Education, but this was 
only partial insurance against cultural assimilation. 
Assimilative forces exerted by the anglophone culture's 
size and ease of penetration cannot be forestalled by 
Quebec alone. Extra-societal, francophone (ie. non-assimi- 
lative) reinforcement is needed.
Therefore, given the external pressures upon Quebec's 
cultural-national survival, and thus the internal pressures 
upon the state to intervene, it was inevitable that the 
Quebec government should seek to institutionalize the spa­
cial transmission of culture, by establishing relations 
with francophone societies abroad. It was all the more in­
evitable given Quebec's non-acceptance of Ottawa as a 
faithful representative of the French Canadian culture.
In pursuing this hypothesis - that there exists a 
logical and essential relationship between Quebec's cul­
tural-national survival and its international relations - 
the aforementioned areas will be studied in depth. To place 
the entire question within a proper perspective, the work 
will proceed with some theoretical considerations of the 
components and processes of culture, how these are related 
to the socio-political concepts of nation and of state.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and how technology affects each one. Against this theoreti­
cal background the practical, political experience of Que­
bec will be examined. The Church's ideology of survival, 
the re-orientation of the political process, and the 
emergence of new policies for cultural preservation are 
included.
The second chapter of this study provides a detailed 
review of Quebec's international activities, focusing on 
the 1960's. It is both an historical account of Quebec's 
emergence upon the external plane and a measure of its pre­
sent involvement there. While it does not encompass 
entirely all phases of Quebec's transnational relations, it 
is an attempt to record, as comprehensively as possible, 
the major domestic and international confrontations and 
developments in which both Ottawa and Quebec are key actors. 
The chapter concludes by relating changes in the govern­
mental process which effectively established an interna­
tional role for Quebec, to the previously mentioned changes 
in the political process.
The third chapter consists of three parts each of 
which is an expansion of the salient and sometimes diverse 
points of view advanced by the major disputants, Ottawa 
and Quebec. The first section briefly covers the legal, 
constitutional arguments in which Ottawa appears, to this 
author at least, to enjoy a decisive advantage. The second 
and third parts centre on Quebec's political and cultural 
arguments respectively. They express Quebec's need and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5desire to conduct international relations and thus form the 
basis for understanding that government's actions.
The conclusion reviews and draws together the various 
elements discussed in an attempt not only to confirm the 
hypothesis, but also to treat the subject, the international 
relations of Quebec, as a contemporary political problem.
In so far as the international relations of Quebec 
remains a political problem, it threatens, in Atkey's words, 
"not only the internal maintenance of the Canadian federa­
tion, but the position of the federation in the interna­
tional community" (The Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 
153)* Any study of that problem is therefore of consider­
able relevance. It is hoped that by placing this contem­
porary, controversial subject within a cultural, rather 
than the all too often legal-constitutional, context, a 
much needed dimension may be added. This dimension, the 
author hopes, will provide a broader understanding of the • 
problem.
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CHAPTER I 
CULTURE AND POLITICS
Culture, Nation and State * 
Some Theoretical Considerations
Since "culture" occupies a fundamental position with­
in the hypothesis, the bounds of that term must be made 
clear. The author therefore will attempt to establish a 
concept of culture which is at once relevant, and appli­
cable to a particular situation.
Whatever else might distinguish Man from other animals, 
culture is certainly the most crucial aspect. Moreover, 
because Man, unlike other animals, has few if any instinc­
tive skills and no instinctive knowledge which might enable 
him to sustain himself, either singly or in groups, culture 
is essential %
...it provides the knowledge and the techniques that 
enable Man to survive, both physically and socially, 
and to master and control, insofar as it is possible, 
the world around him...(Chinoy, p. 4?).
1 The use of "concept" over "definition" expresses the 
author * s bias toward the grasping rather than the pin­
pointing of an idea or term. Where little consensus exists 
despite a myriad of definitions, as in the case of "culture", 
this approach proves useful. Kroeber agrees t
...What culture is can be better understood from know­
ledge of what forms it takes and how it works than by 
a definition. Culture is in this respect like life or 
matter t it is the total of their varied phenomena 
that is more significant than a concentrated phrase 
about them...(p. 60),
_  6 -
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Culture is thus the special and exclusive product of
Man, embodying at once those characteristics of a "rational"
and of a "social" animal. For Man lives in two worlds t he
is part of nature, and part of the man-made world within
which he himself is socialized. Through his capacity to
reason, Man creates out of the natural conditions of his
existence, a social world - a social network of activities
(be they political, economic, religious or otherwise) which
"constitute Man's most sophisticated attempts to realize
the potentialities of his own nature" (Verene, p. 2), It is
culture which epitomizes Man's creative interaction with
his natural and social environments; it is culture which
enables Man to structure these relationships, to order his
own existence.
Culture therefore integrates Man's total environment,
and thus, according to Quebec's Royal Commission of Inquiry
2
on Constitutional Problems , the purpose or object of
culture can be stated as t
...the systematic, balanced, hierarchic "valorization" 
of (Man's) complex potentialities with a view to his 
completest fulfilment and the fullest fruition of his 
existence...(vol. 2, p. ?).
Yet the essence of culture is its social nature. In­
deed, it has been stated that culture is to the group what 
personality is to the individual (Royal Commission on Bi­
lingualism and Biculturalism; Report, vol. 1, p. xxxi- 
xxxii). While this may be a fine and somewhat contentious
Hereafter cited as the Tremblay Report.
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point, it nevertheless underscores the close relationship 
between society and culture.
Man, as previously mentioned, substitutes knowledge 
and technique for his lack of animal instinct, and uses his 
faculties of oral and literal communication to survive. Man 
is thus a "time-binding" animal, in the sense that "he 
binds time by transcending it, through influencing other 
generations by his actions" (Kroeber, p. 8). Therefore 
culture (the totality of technique for environmental mas­
tery), being both learned and shared, necessitates men to 
continue the learning and sharing process; otherwise, 
culture will be neither created nor maintained. This is 
Man’s distinction. Human beings are designated as such pre­
cisely because they are animals with the ability to create 
for themselves a culture »
...so far as Man is concerned, culture always has 
society as a counterpart; it rests on, and is carried 
by, society. Beyond the range of Man there are societies 
but no cultures. Cultural phenomena thus characterize 
Man more specifically than his social manifestations 
characterize him, for these latter he shares with ver­
tebrate and invertebrate animals...(Kroeber, p. 61).
Thus we have come full-circle t culture, embodying
both the rational and social natures of Man, allows him to
master and structure his total environment - not only in
order to survive, but to realize his individual and group
potentials as well.
From the perspective of content, culture is composed 
of, or encompasses, three basic elements * knowledge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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values, and means of expression . The first of these com­
ponents, knowledge, embraces the whole vast body of ideas 
by which men account for their observation and experience, 
and which they take into account or rely upon in choosing 
alternative lines of action. It encompasses all forms of 
cognition and is thus an essential cultural component t
...In its principle as in its process of development, 
culture is primarily knowledge, the acquisition and 
mastery of learning, and the shaping, for that purpose, 
of the intelligence and other faculties of the mind... 
(Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 8).
Values, on the other hand, are the standards and 
ideals by which men define their goals, regulate their in­
teraction with society, and judge themselves and others. 
They are general precepts to which men give their alle­
giance; they are learned and they are shared. Attitudes of 
approval and disapproval, judgments of good or bad, desir­
able or undesirable - toward specific persons, things.
3 There is as much consensus regarding the components of 
culture, as there is regarding its definition. Frequently 
quoted is Tylor’s I87I enumeration t
...Culture...is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities■acquired by Man as a member of 
society...(as quoted in Chinoy, p. 46; Merkl, p. 40; 
and Kroeber, p. 60).
Each writer submits his own list reflecting, as is natural, 
his personal prejudices or interests. Leslie White's divi­
sion, for example, includes four sectors of culture - ideo­
logical, sociological, sentimental or attitudinal, and 
technological (Hammond, p. 48). Each sector is strongly 
dependent upon Man’s symbolic faculty. While this is surely 
an acceptable social science orientation, it tends toward 
proliferation, whereas simplification is more desirable.
This particular tri-component description which is bor­
rowed from the Tremblay Report (vol. 2, p. 8), represents 
the essence of most other attempts. All this only serves 
to emphasize the "basic" nature of these three elements.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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situations, and events - all have as their common root, 
values. In this connection, values and knowledge are inter­
dependent, as the former shares with the latter a strong 
hearing on the concept of culture t
...Values are the criteria of appreciation, the norms 
according to which Man judges, not knowledge itself... 
but the use to be made of knowledge. In terms of 
values, branches of knowledge are chosen and classified 
according to their respective purposes and ordered for 
life. The sense of values is the integrating principle, 
the very soul of culture...(Tremblay Report, vol. 2, 
p. 9).
The acquisition, progress, and mere existence of cul-
4
ture depends upon the third element, means of expression .
In all its parts and aspects, culture relies upon Man’s 
symbolic faculty, or, more specifically, upon articulate 
speech. Thus language comes to hold a principal position 
within the cultural concept. Language is the necessary in­
strument of culture, just as communication generally is a 
fundamental aspect of social life and processes. It is the 
vital link by which all is learned and shared.
From the foregoing it is evident that culture is made 
up of a collection of organic components. While each con­
stituting element has its own special purpose, together 
they are mutually dependent. Knowledge, values and means of
4 While "means of expression" is here treated in rela­
tion to Man’s ability to communicate in a symbolic manner, 
primarily through the use of language, it may also refer to 
material things (instruments, machinery, works of art, 
books, etc.). There exists a fine line, however, between 
the means of expression and the expression itself, and such 
cultural artifacts may be considered as either. But since 
material objects usually appear as products of a culture, 
they are not treated here as "means of expression".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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expression âre essential to each other, but even more to 
the whole; and that whole, culture, while itself a syn­
thesis, provides for Man (individually and collectively) 
both order and synthesis. In short, it defines his exis­
tence.
In its processes, culture is basically social. Commu­
nication and society are the sine qua non. For culture to 
exist, to grow, to attempt to fulfil its purposes, the 
transmission of culture is therefore essential.
This transmission of culture may be either temporal or 
spacial, or even - and it is today more the rule than the 
exception - a combination of both. Temporal transmission 
reflects the "social heritage” aspects of culture (Linton, 
p. 69-79). It flows from tradition, from an accumulation 
of ancestral or generational cognitive, evaluative and ex­
pressive ideas, adapted over time for reasons of survival 
in its varied forms. It is a handing-down, a sharing of 
experience from the old to the young; it is a process of 
regeneration and of socialization. In this sense, temporal 
transmission tends toward the persistence, strengthening 
and stability of a culture, and the mother-tongue serves as 
its most effective instrument.
While temporal transmission resists so far as it is 
possible (and/or desirable) extra-cultural influences, 
spacial transmission, because it is primarily a process of 
cultural diffusion, promotes change. Here, the acceptance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of foreign elements and systems constitutes a geographical 
spread; and the cultural content of foreign origin which 
gradually accumulates, is normally quite high within any 
given culture. Furthermore, once the new cultural element 
is smoothly integrated within a culture, its source becomes 
forgotten and irrelevant. Spacial transmission is thus an 
inter-societal, integrative process, emphasizing the more 
passive or receptive faculties of culture.
This is not to say, however, that there are no resis­
tances, strains, and dislocations against the importing of 
cultural elements. Since most societies are dynamic, a re­
distribution of cultural elements affects the total cul­
tural structure within a society and may result in social 
upheavals, usually attributed to an accumulation of 
internal strains. Often, however, the source of the cul­
tural dislocation stems from external influences. Only the 
final climax of conversion is internal. Put another way, 
spacial transmissions of culture may be subtle and covert, 
with the consequences slowly evolving to a point of frus­
trating complexity which might underpin revolutionary 
change.
On the other hand, there are the obvious manifestations 
of cultural diffusion t the continuous first-hand, face-to- 
face contacts which contribute to acculturation, and which 
border, at times, on assimilation. Such cultural confron­
tations often provoke an acute self-awareness t
...the group becomes conscious of the fact that it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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constitutes a community of patterns of feelings - or 
rather, has a common unconscious psyche - and possesses 
its own unity and individuality, its own will to en­
dure in existence...(Maritain, p. 5)»
This realization is all the more acute where contacts tend
to be pervasive. Self-awareness is thus reaffirmed or,
perhaps, a newly awakened consciousness of collective per-
5
sonality gives birth to the idea, "nation" . Henceforth, 
the lines of cultural demarcation are drawn; the "we"- 
group and a "they"-group are established. This internaliza­
tion of culture induces nationalism.
However, if, in the process of transmission (be it 
temporal or spacial), this national culture is subjected 
to a chronic imbalance between the two goals of preserva­
tion and progress, the nation must look to that authority
6
entrusted with the pursuit of its common good, the state .
5 So as to distinguish between "nation" and "state" - 
two terms which are often (and mistakenly) used interchan- 
gably - the following is suggested t by "nation" we mean, 
v...a community of people who feel that they belong to­
gether in the...sense that they share deeply significant 
elements of a common heritage..^"(Emerson, p. 95); "...a 
multitude of humans characterized by common and unique cul­
tural factors...(sharing) in a common historical past and 
...linked by an awareness of its uniqueness..."(Heiman in 
Russell, p. 329).
While "state" will soon be defined, suffice it to say 
now that, whereas "nation" is a subjective term, "state" 
is wholly objective (Gatlin, p. 333/* This subjective 
quality of "nation" is for Emerson the essence 1
...The simplest statement that can be made about a 
nation is that it is a body of people who feel that 
they are a nation; and it may be that when all the 
fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ulti­
mate statement as well...(p. 102).
6 In addition to the objective-subjective distinction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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If, on the one hand, diffusion is denied, then there is a 
risk of cultural isolation resulting in sterility or stag­
nation. On the other hand, if
...the functions of collective life proceed from an 
inspiration foreign to the culture or is, in fact, 
dominated by foreign elements, the relations of cul­
tural exchange between Man and his social environment 
are mixed up; the homogeneity of the ethnic environ­
ment is weakened and the nation’s renewal organism 
and then, sooner or later, its survival are threatened 
.♦«(Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 21).
In either case, the state intervenes. It alone 
possesses both the power and the authority necessary to 
confer juridical existence upon the institutions of common 
life, to effect the institutionalization of the processes 
of culture where those processes, if allowed free play, 
might thwart the expressed common will. Indeed, the insti­
tutionalization and regulation of the temporal and spacial 
transmissions of culture are already evident, particularly 
through education and media control.
Contributing to this development in no small way, is 
7
technology . Its effects are ubiquitous * neither culture.
previously drawn between the state and nation respectively, 
the state is a politico-legal entity and the nation, a 
socio-cultural one. The two, however, may be coincident 
and, in that case, there exists a nation-state. Moreover, 
where the organizing principle or dominant ideology of the 
state becomes that of nationality, we have a nationalist- 
state. But state and nation are often not concordant terms. 
The state, the political society, usually encompasses 
heterogeneous national elements.
7 Technology is employed here in the same sense that 
Grant (Technology and Empire) uses the term; it is Ellul's 
"technique" s "...the totality of methods rationally
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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nor nation, nor even state go untouched. And as culture, 
nation and state are interrelated, so too are the effects 
on them which technology brings to bear.
Technology moulds the actions, thoughts and imaginings 
of men (Grant, p. 15). It becomes, in an attempt to over­
come chance, the unlimited master of men by men; and this 
technological mastery of all things has become, in itself, 
an end. Furthermore, to the degree that values are not 
independent of the will to. technology (as Grant would 
argue ), culture is diminished. Its "soul", its "integrating 
principle", is itself mastered, mechanically submerged in 
the stream of technique.
Ferkiss disagrees with this Ellul-based argument, but 
not, however, with its conclusions for culture. Certainly, 
cultural order in the technological age is rapidly disinte­
grating; but this is largely due to "...the subordination 
of technology to the values of earlier historical eras and 
its exploitation by those who do not understand its impli­
cations and consequences..." (Ferkiss, p. 36). For Ferkiss,
arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given
stage of development) in every field of human activity..."
(Ellul, p. xxv).
8 ...As moderns we have no standards by which to judge
particular techniques, except standards welling up 
with our faith in technical expansion...(Grant, p. 3^)• 
In the pursuit of technological efficiency, any values which 
are not part and parcel of, or which do not stem from, 
technique, are skepticized into oblivion and illegitimacy 
(p. 129). This is the reason, according to Grant, why edu­
cational content is becoming increasingly "value-free".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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therefore, the central danger facing mankind in the latter 
part of the twentieth century lies neither in the autonomy 
of technology, nor in the triumph of technological non­
values. Rather, it is the danger of an extreme alienation, 
an alienation between Man and his milieu *
...what emerges as the pattern of the future is not 
technological man so much as neoprimitive man trapped 
in a technological environment...(p. 1?3).
Bourgeois man and the world of technique combine for the
fragmentation, disintegration, and general destruction of
9
the cultural order (p. 201) .
However one wishes to approach the process, and what­
ever conclusions one might draw therefrom, the impact of 
technology on culture is both inevitable and considerable. 
It is no less substantial on the collective personality, 
the nation. Here, high rates of industrialization, urbaniza­
tion, and socio-occupational mobility (all equally stimu­
lated by technology), create, in Wheatcroft’s words, "loss 
of roots", "psychological homelessness", "existential 
insecurity", "lack of firm consensus on basic values and 
norms", "atomization", "impersonality", and a "disintegra­
tion of group continuity" (in Mann, vol. 1, p. 327-329).
The sense of community, the consciousness of collective
9 To whomever one turns, ceteris paribus, the results 
are the same t Marcuse already mourns the passing, the de­
sublimation of Man's second dimension, his "higher culture"; 
Ellul speaks of the explosion of local and national cul­
tures, for they are unable to coexist with technique (p. 
130); and Wheatcroft, like Ferkiss, focuses on the cultural 
consequences of "extensive reality negotiation" (in Mann, 
vol. 1, p. 338) in this technological age.
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personality, the subjective psychology of "we"-ness -
essential ingredients of the nation concept - are all, in
the extreme, abolished. On this point, Ellul is frank *
...(technical development) dissociates the sociologi­
cal forms, destroys the moral framework, desacralizes 
men and things, explodes social and religious taboos, 
and reduces the body social to a collection of indi­
viduals. The most recent sociological studies (even 
those made by optimists) hold that technique is the 
destroyer of social groups, of communities (whatever 
their kind), and of human relations. Technical progress 
causes the disappearance...of that 'amalgam of 
attitudes, customs and social institutions which con­
stitute a community*. Communities break up into their 
component parts. But no new communities form. The 
individual in contact with technique loses his social 
and community sense as the frameworks in which he 
operated disintegrate under the influence of tech­
niques... (p. 126).
Quite different are the effects of technique on the
state. Whereas, under the impact of technology, culture and
nation are subjected to forces of disintegration, the state
is compelled to centralize. In terms both of causation and
of replacement, organizational complexity serves sociologi-
10
cal disunity. Similarly, concentrations of power supplant 
civic efficacy. Possessing the power and legitimacy, the 
state is called upon increasingly, by circumstance or 
citizenry, to support, to plan and/or to conduct the affairs
10 Franz L. Neumann, in writing (1950) about the relation­
ship of technology to power, hypothesized that ;
...the higher the state of technological development, 
the greater the concentration of political power...(p.
170).
Theobald agrees, but decries not so much the concentration 
of power per se, as our lack of contingency plans for this 
development :
...our present institutional structures are designed 
to increase our power rather than to control our power 
...(in Mann, vol. 1, p. 7).
This, for him, is our central dilemma.
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of society. Moreover, in an age of rapid change - which is 
the age of technique - that necessitates planning precision 
(Grant's "overcoming of chance"); in turn, there evolves, 
again by necessity, a decision-making process of unprece­
dented intricacy. In the face of technology, therefore, the 
state becomes, in short, ever more powerful, ever more 
centralized.
Yet technology cuts with a double blade * one is do­
mestic, the other, external. It reinforces, on the one 
hand, state structures and strength. It facilitates, on the 
other hand, primarily through vast networks of communica­
tion and intelligence services, penetration t
...as technology advanced, the opportunities for 
penetration increased...
...(state) boundaries have become porous. Techniques 
have been fashioned to provide agents of one (state) 
with direct access to the population and processes of 
another.(Scott, I965, p. 12 and v).
From this inevitable permeation of previously isola­
ting barriers against effective culture contact, there 
arises a threat to the balanced, essential processes of 
culture (and therefore of nation). This evokes a reaction 
from the state when the state's role as protector is itself 
partially diminished. Out of these conditions of a tech­
nological age, culture, nation and state merge. From the 
perceived assimilation there is an apprehensive feed-back 
and from this, in turn, the nationalist-state arises. Inno­
vative reinforcement of culture and of nation occurs, for, 
paradoxically, where technology renders traditional
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structures and institutions obsolete, only change preserves.
Quebec can be studied from this point of view. Tradi­
tional ideologies and institutions which, in the past, had 
interpreted and preserved French Canadian culture, have 
today been found unsuitable. In the temporal transmission 
of culture. Church gave way to state. Now, increasingly, 
out of the modern conditions of Quebec's existence in 
Canada and in North America, even a state-reinforced 
temporal transmission is, for survival purposes, insuffi­
cient. Extra-cultural, extra-national, support is required.
That Quebec has indeed undergone this development - 
from cultural preservation through isolation, to a deter­
mined state involvement in the temporal and spacial trans­
missions of culture - and, that such a development has 
posed certain problems for the state of Quebec, as for the 
Canadian state, are the subject-matters dealt with below.
Culture, Nation and State i 
The Quebec Experience
...The Quebecker is no longer a metropolitan Frenchman, 
but neither has he become a North American - Yankee or 
Canadian. Over the centuries he has forged a different 
collective personality...(Rioux, p. 9)»
Through the forceful interplay of historical and 
environmental factors there has emerged, in the Province of 
Quebec, a unique culture, or, at least, a subjective cul­
tural distinction the issue of which has become the Québé­
cois nation. Since the Conquest, policies to ensure the
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survival of .that nation have been propounded, and the 
politics of Quebec has been, historically, the politics of 
survival.
11
The Conquest as a starting point is quite significant
for.
...the French Canadian clergy found itself, in 1763, 
the only representative of the national conscience and 
the national culture, the only elite...(Rioux, p. 35).
Having thus a near monopoly over the definition of the pur­
poses and policies for cultural-national preservation, it
was natural that the Church should proceed with such formu-
12
lations within its own frame of reference . Yet not until
11 ...nearly every French Canadian, viewing the place of 
his community in Canada, almost invariably begins with 
an interpretation of the meaning of the British 
Conquest...(Cook, 1971, p. 100).
For a general overview of the purpose and force of the inter­
pretations, see "Conqu&tisme", p. 99-113 in Cook, 1971.
12 That frame of reference is well described by the 
Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 35-39* It embodies three basic 
concepts s (T)the sense of order (which is "the very 
essence of...the social doctrine of the Catholic Church");
(2) the sense of liberty ("... it means living according to 
the requirements of order as established by the natural 
lav;, which is itself illuminated by Revelation..."); and
(3) the sense of progress (ie. 'real* progress t "...an 
improvement of the man himself by a constant raising of his 
intellectual and moral level..."). This religious concept 
of life is reflected, organizationally, in the society of 
Quebec which they favoured % (a) it was personalist (that 
is to say, it espoused systems of work and property which 
ensured maximum autonomy - agriculture and crafts, or more 
recently, small businesses, co-operatives. Catholic trade 
unions, etc.); (b) it was communal (ie. there existed an 
organic unity amongst family, profession and parish - the 
latter being, "the mother institution of public institu­
tions", "the veritable centre of social life"). See also 
Falardeau in Rioux and Martin, p. 3^2-357» in addition. 
Cook's anthology (I969) contains the best known formulations 
which were derived from this frame of reference.
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after the 1837-38 Rebellion and after the assimilative im­
plications of Lord Durham's Report, did these nationalistic 
formulations have their fullest impact. Bonenfant and 
Falardeau point this out t
...Group consciousness and patriotic feeling...developed 
...after the British Conquest, as a result of isolation, 
contrast and struggle with the culturally-alien 
conquering group... .
but,
...Quebec nationalism as a political expression...ac­
tually came to life against the assimilation attempt 
of the Union Act...(in Cook, I969, p. 19-20 and 22).
For the greater part of the next century, then, the
political and socio-economic thinking of Québécois - with a
view to survival - was strongly coloured by the traditional
teachings and influence (the social doctrine) of the French
13
Canadian Catholic Church . It began with G a m e  au and con­
tinued with Groulxî it was characterized by the promotion 
of the three myths, I'agriculturalisme, 1'anti-etatisme and 
le messianisme (Brunet, p. 113-166); it was a nationalism 
wholly "defensive", "apostolic and formalistic".
13 The Church certainly dominated the ideology of survi­
val, but that ideology was by no means monolithic. Others - 
Lafontaine, Cartier, Tache - advocated survival through 
political participation (double majority theory); Papineau, 
an anti-cleric, desired annexation to the United States; 
Laurier, Bourassa and Laurendeau - each to varying degrees - 
sought cultural preservation in a pan-Canadian, rather than 
an English-dominated or British-oriented, state. However, 
even those who subscribed to the larger pan-Canadian nation­
alism advocated the absolute maintenance of a French Cana­
dian culture and retreated to (more or less) defensive po­
sitions in moments of crisis. Indeed, in such moments of 
crisis - economic, political or military - that defensive 
nationalism was rooted more strongly in definitions of race, 
religion, language and history.
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"traditionalist", "conservative and bourgeois" (Leger in 
Cook, 1969, p. 306); it wove into a close and mutually in­
terdependent association, cultural and religious values;
but most importantly, on the political plane, that tradi-
14
tional nationalism was reactionary . When the state was 
used as an instrument for cultural-national survival (most 
notably under Mercier and Duplessis), it was cast in a 
somewhat negative role - as a protector, a barrier against 
external threats, and thus, in withdrawal, fostering 
further isolation.
All this is in contrast to contemporary purposes and 
policies. Certainly, some traditional strains remain and 
form the foundations for the present. However, the nation­
alist spectrum has widened considerably, and the mainstream 
has at its source, indigenous, secular and progressive ele­
ments, At the heart of this development is the growing 
acceptance of, and emphasis upon, the positive role of the 
state.
Cut off from their cultural fountainheads, France and 
Rome, during World War II, an increasing number of French
14 The most outspoken and politically active Churchmen 
have been, until recently, ultramontane. (The basic prin­
ciples of French Canadian nationalistic ultramontanism, as 
laid down by Mgr. Laflèche, are found in Wade, I968, vol. 1, 
p. 346.) With a deep suspicion of democracy and of the state, 
and strongly authoritarian in political matters, the Church 
was the object of much criticism particularly after WW II.
See especially * Trudeau, I968, "Some Obstacles to Democracy 
in Quebec"; Trudeau, 1970; and, in Cook, I969, "Quebec on 
the Eve of the Asbestos Strike"; see also Corbett, p. 127-
132.
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Canadians attended English Canadian and American universities, 
and received there applied, pure, and social science 
training (Wade in Park, p. 375)* Thus, the post-war intel­
lectual elite of Quebec was, ulike previous generations of 
classically-educated leaders, both more aware and more op­
timistic regarding the potentials of democracy and of the 
state. With the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the state 
would advance and direct, rather than isolate and protect, 
the socio-economic and cultural developments of Québécois.
The School of Social Sciences at Laval, 1 ‘Institut Canadien 
des Affaires publiques, and Cité Libre were symbols of this 
new thought.
Yet, while this "quiet revolution" of political, eco­
nomic and sociological thought was not, originally, ‘other- 
directed* , the consequences which it occasioned, were. From 
this there arose Quebec's neo-nationalism.
Guindon traces the development of this modern nation­
alism to the breakdown in the 1950's of "mutually satisfying 
institutional self-segregation" (in Kruhlak, p. 88-93)• The 
post-war bureaucratization of Quebec had created a large, 
white-collared middle class which, because it had been edu­
cated in modern technology, business and industry, rejected 
the old nationalist tenets and myths, as embodied by the 
policies of Duplessis $ "to resist assimilation from with­
out, to resist emancipation from within" (Cook, I966, p. 99)* 
These were incompatible with the modernization ethic; they
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hampered rationalization; they ignored the singularly impor­
tant criterion of objective competence. Thus the efforts of 
this new middle class were directed towards reform at home, 
towards the modernization and rationalization of Quebec's 
society and institutions, towards the removal of those ele­
ments which impeded their own progress, towards the defeat, 
therefore, of Duplessis. It was not anti-English or anti- 
American. It was not conservative t
...Modernization, bureaucratic rationality, and per­
sonal qualification became the tools for the new middle 
class to assess the worth of not only the institutions 
but also the ideologies of the past. Ethnically homo­
genous, the new middle class was not initially ethnic­
ally conscious...
...The values of the middle class were those of modern 
liberalism with emphasis on progress and social change 
articulated partly in class interests but not in terms 
of ethnic conflict...(Guindon in Kruhlak, p. 84-86),
The progress of this class was defined by occupational
mobility. However, since the Quebec bureaucracy was more or 
less specialized and of a smaller scale and size (these 
were due to Duplessis* autonomist policies which duplicated 
the federal bureaucracy but, of course, on a much smaller 
scale), middle class growth was restricted by the channels 
of mobility on the one hand, and by the levels of mobility 
on the other. These were structural constraints of an occu­
pational and geographical nature. While the former could be 
and was partially overcome by a bureaucratic transformation 
of the traditional institutions, the latter constraint in­
volved ethnic contact, and the breakdown of self-segregated 
institutions. The ethnic competition thus engendered gave
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rise to a new nationalism.
This neo-nationalism was completely compatible with the 
new middle class ethic. Indeed, its driving force was 
modernization and development t the modernization and de­
velopment of the state of Quebec - for it and it alone was 
perceived as capable of providing for French-speaking Québé­
cois, not only opportunities on a non-disciminatory basis, 
but also, at last, the "possession of their rightful heri­
tage" *
...The advent of liberal democracy to the province bore 
promise of power for all classes henceforth. But in 
practice the newly self-conscious classes have found 
most roads to a better life blocked » the clergy clings 
to its grip on education, the English continue to domi­
nate our finances, and the Americans intrude upon our 
culture. Only Quebec as a state would appear to belong 
unquestionably to French Canadians; and the fullest 
power for that state is therefore highly desirable... 
(Trudeau, 1968, p. 173).
That Quebec began to see itself as a twentieth-century 
industrial society, and that it began to look to the future 
(rather than past) for its Golden Age, were, for Rioux, "the 
two most significant changes of the early I960's" (p. 78).
A new reckoning - with itself, with Canada, and with the 
world - was taking shape. The Liberals, to be sure, ex­
pressed both in form and in substance the prevalent desire 
of Québécois to be "maîtres chez nous". This first had the 
stamp of equality 1 an equality of opportunity, an equality 
of economic, political, and socio-cultural conditions. Even 
"associate state" and "special status" advocates, because 
their proposals all pivot on the two-nation thesis, desire, 
implicitly - if not explicitly - equality t
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...they (all such proponents) exhibit one predominant 
motive: they want their community to have in the
structure of Canada an accepted equality with the En­
glish speaking people...(Brady in Fox, p. 29).
To this end, the lesage government undertook a series 
of confrontations, - in Canada (demands for a larger share 
of the direct tax field, for the elimination of joint-cost 
programmes, for the end, in short, of 'creeping central!- 
zation', the greatest impediment to effective economic plan­
ning), and in Quebec (the establishment of hospital and 
welfare services, of regional and general economic corpora­
tions, the restructuring of the provincial civil service, 
the public ownership of hydro power, and "the institutiona­
lization of the temporal transmission of culture" - i.e.
15
the creation of a public school system) . The passage of 
government in 1966 from the Liberals to the Union Nationals 
did not, fundamentally, alter this trend. The "State of 
Quebec" in its positive role had come to stay.
Furthermore, the die of that positive state had been 
cast; there was no possible retreat from the realization
15 It is of interest to point out one separatist's view 
of these confrontations. In so far as the reform measures 
were equality-directed, and in so far as they expressed the 
"ideology of catching up", they were "essentially a negation 
of Quebec as a nation":
...Only the ideology of catching up is by definition 
federalist, for it envisages the pure and simple 
integration of the Quebec people in a greater 
American world, through the intermediary of Canada... 
(Rioux, p. 79)'
For the separatists, the assertion of the state ought 
to proceed hand in hand with an assertion of the nation, 
until finally, these two attain a coincident maturity as 
manifested in an independent and sovereign nation-state.
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(born prior to, but given full expression in, the "quiet
revolution") that cultural-national survival and economic
development ^ere two sides of the same coin, that they were
inextricably bound up, one with the other. It is a vital
fact today. It is recognized by capitalists and socialists,
by federalists and separatists alike:
...sans prospérité économique, nous ne pourrons jamais 
atteindre les objectifs culturels et sociaux que nous 
rechercherons tous...(Bourassa / QuébecI, p. 11).
...to return to the example of the language, it is 
obvious that its salvation, that is, its existence as 
the deep-rooted expression of the milieux, will remain 
an impossibility until there are powerful economic and 
social motives for speaking French, until French is the 
language of labour and activity in all spheres, the 
language of economic success and social progress... 
(Leger in Cook, 1969, p. 3IO).
Therefore, through the exercise of autonomy (i.e. what­
ever autonomy it may possess and may, in its confrontations, 
gain), the Quebec government is able to institute economic 
programmes which accord with the provincial cultural milieu. 
Projects wherein French is the language of both employer and 
emoloyee, programmes which, in structure and in organization,
16
are inspired by the French genius , are most likely to safe­
guard and reinforce cultural-national values. They tend 
least towards assimilation. At the same time, working within 
his own cultural milieu, the French Canadian employee is more
16 For a discussion of the general, national genius and 
of the specific, French genius, see Tremblay Report, vol. 
2, p. 16-17 and p. 33 respectively.
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economically efficient and, consequently, more likely to 
succeed and to advance. Otherwise - the working environment 
not being culturally hospitable - a sense of diminishment, 
irritation and dissatisfaction, and loss of efficiency 
result (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; 
Report, vol. 1, p. xxlx - xxx).
Economic development promotes cultural progress; and, 
a culturally harmonious workplace produces, in turn, a more 
economically competent workforce.
The question of 'how to survive• is thus answered in 
contemporary Quebec terms. Cultural and economic development 
programmes, attuned to the indigenous environment, are mu­
tually reinforcing.
"Why to survive' is something else again. As it is no
17
longer a question answerable by Mgrs. Lafleche and Paquet ,
neither is it a case of survival-for-survival's-sake. Behind
the policies there lies a purpose. It is a new purpose, a
re-orientation which arose simultaneously with the thought
18
and policies of the "quiet revolution" *
17 These were two noteworthy exponents of the traditional 
"providential mission" of French Canadians. Sec Lafleche's 
"The Providential Mission of the French Canadians", p. 92- 
106, and Paquet's "A Sermon on the Vocation of the French 
Race in America", p. 52-l60# both in Cook, 1969*
18 Part and parcel of the re-interpretation of the state's 
role, was a re-thinking of the form and content of 'la sur­
vivance'. Paul Gerin-Lajoie expressed it well:
...We have survived enough...The time has come to 
give this survival a positive sense, to fix a goal 
for it, and to justify it...(Cook, 1966, p. 23).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
0...Leaving behind them the 1950's, when a vengeful 
self-criticism was the order of the day, Quebeckers 
recovered their self-confidence and began to ask 
themselves what else they could accomplish as a 
community. For a century they had striven to pre­
serve their heritage;; more recently, they had tried 
to catch up with the other North Americans; now 
they ask themselves if they did not have some ori­
ginal contribution to make to the world of human 
societies. They were reasserting their vocation 
as a nation...(Rioux, p. ?6).
That Québécois seek to preserve their linguistic and 
cultural particularisms in the face of an assimilative tech- 
nological era, is no reaction, no defensive preservation of 
the status quo. It is a direct result of the end of isola­
tion. It is the first step in "l'épanouissement des Qué­
bécois" (Sabourin in Le Devoir, p. I69). It is, above all 
else, a proud extroversion which stems from their uniqueness 
as an economically-developed French speaking society: for,
with France, they stand on the brink of post-technological 
development; yet, unlike France, their culture is distinctly 
northern. In both capacities, Quebec serves as an example 
to the predominantly underdeveloped Francophonie, and per- ' 
ceives its contribution to the human race in these terms.
To falter economically, or to succumb culturally, is to lose 
their raison d'etre. Thus, enters once more "1'Etat du 
Québec".
Cultural-national preservation and progress is the 
primary means to the longer-term goal. For this reason, 
greater fiscal autonomy is pursued; education (the temporal 
transmission of culture) is structured and supported (insti­
tutionalized) by the state; spacial transmission is all that
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remains.
If Quebec as a cultural nation is to survive, external 
dultural reinforcement is essential. Quebec sits as a 
French-speaking island of six million in an English-speaking 
sea forty times its size. Its economy is anglo-oriented and, 
in its daily life, it is subjected to a culturally-alien 
bombardment:
...Quebeckers have witnessed the disintegration of the 
way of life which traditionally protected them...
Almost overnight they found themselves in an indus­
trial society requiring massive intervention by the 
state, open to the whole of North America, and ex­
posed to the influence of foreign, especially 
American, culture backed by such powerful means of 
communication as speedy transport, highways, cinema, 
radio, and television...(Preliminary Statement: 
Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, p.
Beyond this sea, however, the French language and
genius thrives (Morrison, p. 11-15). While by no means a
replica of Québécois culture, it is nevertheless a non-
assimilative source of strength and reinforcement. Moreover,
in cultural terms, diffusion - short of assimilation - is
both normal and healthy.
To this, then, the Québécois turn, their principal
instrument of communication being the state.
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THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OP QUEBEC
The history of Quebec's relations with sovereign 
states is, for the most part, not unique. Indeed, until the 
1960's, its development was very much in step with that of 
other Canadian provinces. The quickening pace of activities 
abroad during the 1960's was merely a cultural, political 
and economic manifestation of the previously-mentioned 
reorientations from within.
Canadian provinces have always demonstrated a concern 
over their particular interests abroad, and, in so far as
they were empowered by the constitution, a desire to oro-
1
tect them personally . This was evident from the moment 
Canada opened its first oversea offices. Provincial legis­
lative rights in matters of immigration, agriculture and 
commerce seemed to provide justification, if not authority, 
for the establishment of their own provincial agencies in
1 The following historical account is based upon Andre 
Patry's 1964 submission to the Comité Parlementaire de la 
Constitution (established in I963 by the Assemblée légis­
lative du Québec). Revised in I965, the account appears in 
book form with other submissions which deal with Les Pou­
voirs Extérieurs du Québec (Brossard et al.). This work 
also formed the basis for Daniel Johnson's speech in favour 
of Bill 33, a bill to establish the Department^of Inter­
governmental Affairs. (See Debats de l'Assemblée Législa­
tive, 13 avril 1967, p. 2167-21^111
—  31 —
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Great Britain and elsewhere. On October 31, 1868, delega­
tions of the governments of Canada, New Brunswick, Ontario
and Quebec met in conference. They agreed there that :
...Outre les agences européenes du Canada, chaque pro- 
vince pourra nommer tels agents en Europe ou ailleurs 
qu'elle jugera a propos de choisir et ces agents 
seront dûment accrédités par le gouvernement général 
...(Brossard, p. 67).
It was by virtue of this agreement that Canadian provinces 
were to open offices in Great Britain, and later, in other 
countries of Europe and of America.
In London, however, the simultaneous presence of both 
federal and provincial representatives proved administra­
tively and financially burdensome. It was therefore decided 
in 1874 to group the provincial offices and to place them 
all in the same building, under the authority of the 
Canadian Agent-General. But, when in 1880 the federal govern­
ment named a High-Commissioner (Alexander Galt) to London, 
the provinces soon re-established their own representation 
in the British capital.
These provincial delegations were not formally recog- 
nized by the Imperial Government. Unlike the Australian 
state representatives, the Canadian counterparts received 
no official status because they came from British terri- 
tories wherein the (lieutenant-) governors were not named 
by an imperial act (Keith, vol. 2, p. 651). This absence of 
status, which forced the provincial agents to communicate 
with the Colonial Office via the Canadian High-Commissibner, 
was the source of much friction between the federal
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government (who fully supported the British attitude) and 
certain provincial governments (Keith, vol. 1, p. 343).
Following the first world war, the Canadian High- 
Commissioner in Great Britain attempted to boost the pres-
tige of provincial representatives by conferring upon them
2
certain official functions . Nevertheless, on the eve of 
WW II, when all but British Columbia withdrew their London
agents, no provincial delegation had yet been recognized
3
by the British government »
Quebec's agents in Great Britain and in France date 
from the nineteenth century. While the post at London was 
abolished shortly after its creation and placed under the 
Agent-General of Canada, the Paris office functioned from 
1882 to 1911. During this period. Hector Fabre represented 
both the Dominion and the Quebec governments. He held at 
once the positions of Commissariat général du Canada, and 
Agent commercial et financier du Québec. His successor, 
Phillippe Roy, ceased to perform this dual role and became,
2 The Canadian Annual Review (I923) speaks of this 
attempt :
...adopting the Australian practice, Hon. Mr. Larkin 
(Canadian High-Commissioner) announced his intention 
of associating the Agents-General of the Provinces with 
him in the discharge of some of his duties...The 
Agents-General welcomed the innovation, hoping that it 
might prove a stepping stone to the restoration of 
their constitutional right to direct access to the 
Crown in relation to Provincial affairs which the Do­
minion had refused to acknowledge since Lord Strath- 
cona's time.,.(p. 109).
3 In 1943, Ontario re-established its London Agent-Gene­
ral; other provinces soon followed suit.
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simply, the'Commissioner-Genoral of Canada.
A law adopted in I909 and promulgated in I9II autho­
rized the government of Quebec to name an Agent-General to 
Britain and another to Belgium. Such a delegate was proposed 
- in 1911 for London, and in the course of world war one*
for Brussels. Each agent was thereby placed under the pro-
4
vincial premier's authority . In 193& this law was repealed 
to be replaced by a 1940 statute giving the Department of 
Municipal Affairs, Commerce and Industry authority over 
the nomination and control of Agents-General. Abrogated in 
turn, this legislation was superceded by a new law in I96I 
"qui parle aussi bien de délégués généraux que d'agents 
généraux et qui place ces fonctionnaires sous l'autorité
du ministre de l'Industrie et du Commerce" (Brossard, p.
5
68) .
The official status of Quebec's Delégations-Générales 
(there are presently three : London, New York and Paris) 
has changed very little over time. In the United Kingdom, 
provincial agents may enjoy the same privileges and immu­
nities as foreign consuls; in the United States, provincial
4^ The Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec (1909,
vol. 1) reads :
...He (the Agent-General) shall be under the control 
of the First Minister, and shall follow the instruc- 
tions which may be given him, from time to time, by 
the latter...(p. 2?2).
5 See * Loi relative a l'Agent-général de la province
dans le royaume de Belgique^ Statut du Québec, 1936, ch. 18; 
Loi concernant les agents généraux de la province. Statut 
du Québec, 1940, ch. 10; Loi concernant les agents ou dêlé- 
gues généraux de la province. Statut du Québec, I96O-6I, 
ch. 85.
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delegates have been accorded (by the State Department)
those certain diplomatic privileges which non-official mem-
6
bers of Canadian consulates also enjoy ; and in France, by 
virtue of an agreement between Canada and France, the 
Quebec Delégation-Genérale partakes of similar immunities 
and privileges.
Nevertheless, provincial agents abroad can not be 
officially accredited to the governments of sovereign states, 
nor can they officially negotiate with them. In principle, 
they enjoy no privilege and no immunity. Even in practice, 
it is only by courtesy that, in London, New York and Paris, 
they are accorded privileges of a diplomatic character.
This is not to be confused with a true consular or diplo­
matic status; nor are such courtesies granted elsewhere; 
nor do they extend to other staff members, beyond the Délé­
gué Général. In short, Quebec, like all Canadian provinces, 
possesses no jus lo^ationis.
This absence of jus legationis stems from the fact
7
that "the provinces have no status in international law" .
6 ...Ces avantages...consistent principalement dans l'ex­
emption du service militaire, de l'imp6t^sur le revenu 
et das droits de douane lors du premier établissement 
...(Brossard, p. 69).
In Paris and in London, the privileges and immunities con­
sist of the following i
...l'inviolabilité des locaux et l'immuntté de juridic­
tion quant aux actes accomplis par le délégué général 
dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, ainsi que l'exemption 
d'imp6t sur le revenu et de droits de douane sur les 
importations pour fins officielles ou strictement per­
sonnelles..«(Brossard, p. 237)'
7 Re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, The
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Despite : their lengthy involvement on the international 
plane, the provinces have acquired no legal external rights, 
nor have they particularly aspired to such (Debats, 13 
avril 1967, p. 2176), The federal government for over forty 
years has exercised an exclusive competence in this field 
and, until recently, has done so unchallenged.
Quebec now challenges that position. The reorientation 
of politics at home, and the re-definition of the means and 
ends of cultural-national survival, gave birth to and 
nourished that challenge - a challenge which, having begun 
with Lesage and continued by Johnson and Bertrand, knows no 
party lines; a challenge which, throughout the 1960's, has 
been executed by thought, by word, and especially by deed.
...les premisses de notre action dans le domaine in­
ternational remontent...à ma première entrevue avec 
le président de Gaulle, a l'automne '6I, lors de 
l'ouverture de la Maison du Québec à Paris...(Jean 
Lesage; Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2172-2173).
As with previous openings of Agences-Genérales, there
had been created no constitutional commotion when, in 1940,
the New York office was established. Similarly, the subse-
quent October I96I opening of the Délégation-Générale du
Quebec à Paris did not per se create a problem. (Ontario,
as one province, operated several European agencies at that
Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 
1936"S.C.R. 45l, p. 510* Ihe intention here is not to enter 
upon the legal argument at this stage. That will follow.
The author wishes merely to relate the long-established 
thought regarding provincial rights on the international 
plane, and thus to convey the unconventional nature of 
Quebec's activities in the 1960's.
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time.) Even-the enthusiastic welcome given by France to 
Lesage provoked no suspicion in Ottawa or elsewhere that de 
Gaulle was recognizing Quebec as an international persona­
lity. Nonetheless, a somewhat low-key debate was aroused 
when Quebec wished to obtain for its representatives those 
rights and privileges ordinarily given to consular officers. 
(The question was, as we have seen, resolved to Quebec's 
advantage.) Quebec, for its part, issued a ministerial 
decree granting all foreign consular officers within Quebec 
several fiscal privileges, "tels que l'exemption de l'impôt 
sur le revenu et des droits sur les successions" (Brossard,
p. 239).
Again, in 19&2, Lesage officiated at the opening of 
the new Délégation-Générale in London, naming Lapointe (the 
present Lieutenant-Governor) its representative.
Such activities abroad by the government of Quebec 
were neither novel nor startling; they elicited little 
federal concern. No pattern of exceptional behaviour was 
(or perhaps could have been) deduced from what appeared to 
be, superficially at least, matters of a routine nature. 
However, the next few years of continued and accelerated 
involvement by Quebec with foreign states and international 
bodies were to shed new light upon these first few acts. 
Today, by virtue of hindsight, they are interpreted as 
Quebec's initial forays into the external world. They mark 
the serious quest for an international competence, a quest 
which, throughout that decade, never ceased to arouse grave
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constitutional concerns.
/Early in 1964, a Direction des delegations k l'étranger 
was established within the Department of Industry and 
Commerce. This section was to co-ordinate the activities of 
all Quebec delegations abroad, and, because within those 
delegations several departments were represented, it was to 
regulate administrative problems as well. More important 
perhaps than this administrative housekeeping of external 
involvement was the Quebec-ASTEF agreement in February of 
that same year. This instituted a programme of Franco- 
Québécois exchanges of young civil servants and technicians. 
Yet, while Quebec was to administer that programme, it was 
the federal Department of External Affairs which approved 
and concluded the final arrangements with the Quai d'Oreay, 
and which, in so doing, altered the original content : 
instead of Quebec choosing by itself all ten exchange 
trainees, the Department of External Affairs authorized the 
federal government to nominate two. One can only speculate 
about the impact of the 1964 alteration. It may well have 
been an experience influential upon the following year's 
conduct.
From 1965 to the end of the decade^ Quebec moved 
decidedly into the international arena. In Paris, on Feb- 
ruary 27, 1965, the French and Quebec Ministers of Education
8 ASTEF (l'Association pour l'organisation des stages 
en Franco) is a non-profit, subsidiary agency of the French 
government. The agreement was arranged and administered by 
the Quebec Department of Youth (now Department of Education)
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and the French Director-General of Cultural and Technical 
Affairs negotiated and signed an entente whereby programmes 
of exchanges (teachers, students and researchers) and oo- 
operation in the field of education would proceed. The 
agreement also established a Commission permanente de co­
opération franco-québécois, charged with the administration
and operation of such programmes. It would meet regularly
9
and alternately in Paris and in Quebec . This was followed 
soon after by the establishment of a Service de co-opera- 
tion avec l'extérieur, within Quebec's Education Department.
By being a party to the education entente, Quebec 
seemed to pose a serious precedent in terms of provincial 
relations with another sovereign state. The federal govern­
ment did not modify the terms of that agreement because, 
according to Ottawa, the entente's significance had alrea 
been minimized on the date of signing by: a pre-arranged 
exchange of letters between the French Ambassador and the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs. The exchanged 
letters merely requested and granted the Canadian govern­
ment's consent in the proposed educational programme 
(Federalism and International Relations, p. 2?),
on the one hand, and by the Ecole nationale d'administra­
tion de France, on the other. In matters of external rela­
tions, the French school falls within the jurisdiction of 
the Quai d'Orsay.
9 Such meetings began immediately : Quebec (May, 1965^* 
Paris (November, 1965), Quebec (June, I966), Paris (April, 
1967), As of January 1, 1971, ten conferences have been 
held, the last being in Paris, November-December, 1970.
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Quebec, in contrast to the federal view, presented a
different interpretation of these events. Attaching great
symbolic importance to this entente, it portrayed Ottawa
in a defensive, reactionary role :
...lorsque le Québec a signé la première entente 
France-Québec a Paris le 2? février I965, c'était la 
première fois qu'un gouvernement d'une, province du 
Canada prenait une semblable, initiative en négociant 
lui-même et en signant, dans les formes d'usage, une 
entente internationale de même qu'en participant a une 
commission permanente de co-operation pour en assurer 
la mise en oeuvre. Cet événement a provoqué à l'épo­
que de multiples réactions et a incité le gouvernement 
fédéral k déclarer que le Canada n'avait qu'une seule 
personalité internationale et qu'à ce titre, seul 
l'exécutif fédéral avait le pouvoir de conclure des 
traités. Et, marquant bien sa détermination, le mini­
stre des Affaires extérieures du Canada procédait à  
une échange de lettres avec l'ambassade de France à 
Ottawa le jour même de la signature de l'entente 
France-Québec pour déclarer que l'entente "recontre 
l'assentiment du gouvernement canadien"...(Paul Gerin- 
lajoie; Débats, I3 avril 19&7, p. 21?4).
It matters little, for the purposes of this work, 
which side of the federal-provincial argument is correct.
It is natural - and must be assumed in the absence of ex­
tensive interviews - that Quebec would proceed to further 
action on the basis of its own perceptions of the actors' 
roles, and of the significance of the entente, and not upon 
those perceptions of Ottawa. Indeed, its attitudes and 
deeds shortly thereafter seem to confirm this.
The following month, in April I965, Minister of Edu- 
cation Gerin-Lajoie spoke to the consular corps of Montreal, 
His speech of government policy outlined yet another area 
wherein Quebec wished to assert its international compe­
tence and personality *
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...Sans doute exercez-vous ici vos fonctions en vertu 
d'une autorisation du gouvernement fédéral * mais vous 
êtes, a certains égards, plus près des autorités qué­
bécoises que de celles qui vous ont habilités b  agir 
en qualité'officielle. Én effet, d'une part,^ la juri­
diction de la plupart d'entre vous se borne à des 
circonscriptions entièrement comprises dans les 
limites territoriales du Québec; d'autre part, cette 
même juridiction intéresse, dans une large mesure, 
des domaines relevant strictement de la compétence de 
notre Etat fédéré. D'après la dernière convention de 
Vienne (art^ 5, para, b), les fonctions consulaires 
consistent à favoriser le développement de relations 
commerciales, économiques, culturelles et scienti­
fiques entre l'Etat d'envoi et l'Etat de résidence.
tiqn^ 12 avril 1965» Service d'information du Minis­
ters; p. 1-3).
One may note here that this position did not change under 
the Union Nationale. On May 7, I967» Daniel Johnson affirmed 
that the granting of privileges to consulates within Quebec 
fell within his government's jurisdiction, and that, fur­
thermore, his government was fully prepared to take the 
Initiative in this matter (le Devoir, 8 mai I967, P* 1).
But Quebec pressed forward in 1965* In order to co­
ordinate the various departmental relations with foreign 
governments and organizations, the government announced in 
August that the Deputy Minister of Federal-Provincial 
Affairs would chair a new Commission interministérielle des 
relations extérieures. This committee was composed of 
deputy ministers of departments "likely to have close know­
ledge of relations with foreign countries and groups" 
(Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104); thus, the Departments of 
Federal-Provincial Affairs, Education, Cultural Affairs,
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Industry and'Commerce, and Health were all involved. For
many observers, this move appeared as a first step towards
the creation of a Department of External Affairs, even
though Mr, Lesage, in an attempt to allay these fears, said
that the committee would stick to matters of provincial
jurisdiction (Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104).
The October 19&5 opening of a Bureau économique in
Milan was rather uneventful, particularly when compared to
events of the following month. On November 17, Canada and
Prance concluded a cultural agreement ;
...This agreement established a general framework 
(accord cadre) designed to facilitate arrangements be­
tween provincial governments and the French Government, 
and provided that such arrangements could be entered 
into by the provinces either by reference to the accord 
cadre and exchange of notes or by specific authoriza-
n the part of the Federal Government through a
further exchange of letters...(Federalism and Inteo 
national Relations, p. 28).
The next week, the French Ambassador and the Quebec
Minister of Cultural Affairs signed a cultural entente for
10
co-operation in cultural and artistic fields . The entente, 
however, made no reference either to the accord cadre or to 
an exchange of letters. Instead, the French Ambassador 
merely informed the federal government of this agreement 
and requested Ottawa's assent. This was granted by Mr.
Martin in an exchange of letters that very day, November 24. 
The terms of the "umbrella agreement" were thereby met.
10 Similar to that procedure employed in February, follow- 
ing the educational entente, a Service de co-operation avec 
l'extérieur was established soon after within the Depart­
ment of Cultural Affairs.
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Controversy was, nevertheless, generated by this en­
tente. Some regarded the exchange of letters as quite 
"hasty" (Atkey in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 162; 
and Brossard, p. 195)* indicating that the Department of 
External Affairs was less than prepared for Quebec's 
actions. Others continued the February argument, contending
that Quebec had reaffirmed the significance of that month's
11
precedent-setting education entente . It was not until
July 7, 1970 that Pierre laporte (the 19&5 Minister of
Cultural Affairs) made clear the thinking which lay behind
the lesage government's conduct ;
...J'ai signe la premiere entente culturelle avec 
Paris, l'on m'a fréquemment demande : 'Est-ce que 
Ottawa a etë consulté?' J'aurais fait la manchette de 
tous les journaux, le lendemain, si j'avais dit ; 
Jamais! Nous avons l'intention...et blablabla...J'ai 
répondu aux journalistes : J'ai le choix entre deux 
choses : commencer ici au Canada une querelle sensa- 
tionelle ou signer une entente culturelle avec Par.1 s . 
Qu'est-ce que le plus valable pour le Québec? Alors, 
la veille, l'avant-veille, ou deux semaines avant, le 
gouvernement du Canada a signe des ententes culturelles 
avec Paris. Quel mal cela nous a-t-il fait? J'ai signé 
avec Paris une entente qui^a fait la joie de tout le 
monde et qui, cette fois-là, n'a pas été signé à 
l'occasion d'une querelle. Nous avons eu depuis, sous 
le gouvernement qui nous a précédé et sous celui dont 
j'ai fait partie avant, les fruits de cette entente... 
(Débats, 7 juillet 1970, p. 79%).
Despite conflicting interpretations of roles and actual 
events, 19&5 was certainly a watershed. Quebec, both as a 
province and as a cultural-national community, had
11 ...In the House of Commons...Opposition members charged
that Quebec had started the negotiations without in­
forming the Federal Department of External Affairs, 
and that Canadian assent had been given only after the 
agreement had already been signed...(Morrison, p. 20).
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accomplished much on the international scene. Precedents 
had been set, seeds of controversy planted. Equally impor- 
tsmt was the creation.of administrative machinery, a 
reflection of Quebec's resolve and permanence of action in 
international affairs. Funds had bean allocated and man­
power employed for a vast range of cultural, technical and 
educational programmes, and these projects, all initially 
with France, were designed to enrich and thus to strengthen 
the culture of Quebec. It was the manifestation of a much 
needed, much desired, cultural diffusion.
In terms of Quebec's international relations, little 
occurred the following year. The June I966 provincial elec­
tions had transferred power unexpectedly from the Parti 
liberal to the Union Nationale. Quebec's lack of initiative 
in external affairs was therefore due not so much to a 
period of cooling-off, as to the pre-occupations with in­
ternal governmental consolidation. Indeed, in retrospect, 
this lull was much more the calm before a storm, for early , 
1967 witnessed the first of several moves to entrench those 
rights which, in the eyes of the new Quebec government, had 
already been gained.
In January 1967* jurisdiction over the Delegations- 
Genérales and over other foreign offices of Quebec was 
transferred from the Department of Industry and Commerce, 
to the Office of the Premier. Not only did this provide an 
indication that the government was undergoing a re-organisa­
tion of administration, but it furnished an index of
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priority as well ; the international relations of Quebec 
were to assume a prominent position in the politics of 
Daniel Johnson. The March budget confirmed this latter 
point. Education and cultural affairs formed two of the 
three priorities of the Johnson government, and cultural 
affairs alone received a substantial increase in funds of 
thirty-eight percent. Furthermore, within this area, the 
most favoured item was "la diffusion de la culture". Monies 
directed towards international relations were enlarged by 
twenty percent, to a total of three million dollars.
Divided amongst four major ministries, this last sum was 
allotted for two purposes only * (a) different co-operative 
efforts, but particularly to the application of Franco- 
Quebec educational and cultural accords; and (b) déléga- 
tions-générales and agences du Québec abroad (le Devoir,
18 mars 1967* p. 4),
In April I967, the salience of Quebec's international 
role was reaffirmed. Regarded by Sabourin as "the most 
important initiative that Quebec has taken" (in Clarkson, 
p. 105), the National Assembly debated and adopted Bill 33» 
This bill established the Department of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, a central co-ordinating authority under whose 
jurisdiction would fall the Delégations-Genérales, the 
Agences du Quebec, and all of the province's "external" 
activities. According to Johnson, several factors contri­
buted towards the necessity of that bill; of these, four 
were quite dominant :
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...Premièrement, le désir du Québec d'occuper]ieine^ 
ment tous les domaines de sa compétence et, a cette
fin, de se donner les moyens d'action les plus ef- 
ficaces possibles, tant sur le plan de l'élaboration' 
des politiques que sur celui de la co-ordination de 
ses positions.
...Deuxièmement, l'objectif de hater la solution du 
problème constitutionnel canadien et en même temps 
d'élargir les horizons du Québec dans les domaines 
de sa compétence,  ^ ^
...Troisièmement, la nécessite de mettre un terme a 
la dispersion actuelle, dispersion entre divers mini­
stères, des responsabilités administratives, notam­
ment en ce qui concerne l'action extra-territoriale 
du Québec, particulièrement dans le cas des délé­
gations générales du Québec a l'étranger et des 
ententes avec la France dans les domaines de 1' 
éducation et de la culture.
...Quatrièmement, l'évolution normale du ministère 
des Affaires fédérales-provinciales dont les respon­
sabilités actuelles comprennent non seulement les 
relations de Québec avec le gouvernement central et 
les gouvernements des autres provinces mais, aussi, 
par la force des choses, les relations du Québec 
avec tous les autres gouvernements...(Débats. 13 
avril 1967, p. 2167).
While in its operation, the new department would direct 
its efforts toward two major sectors, that of federal-pro­
vincial relations and that of international relations, the 
latter field was by far the most contentious. Assurances 
that "cette initiative ne vise pas a donner au Québec des 
droits qu'il n'aurait pas" were given both by Johnson and by 
the new Department's Deputy Minister, Claude Morin (in 
Debats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2170 and in be Devoir, p. 178 
respectively). Nonetheless, many believed this to be a new 
manifestation of Quebec's international ambitions. To be 
sure, arguments in favour of the bill and duties assigned 
to the Department, did nothing to mitigate those concerns. 
Gerin-Lajoie, particularly, in expressing the Opposition's
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support for the bill, provoked, rather than allayed, federal 
fears:
...On I'a assez souligné, ce projet de loi ne confère 
au Québec aucun pouvoir nouveau dans les affaires 
internationales. Il constitue cependant une nouvelle 
étape, un pas de plus dans l'affirmation de role et 
d'une personnalité de nature internationale pour le 
Québec. En créant un organisme administratif chargé 
de coordonner toutes ses activités k l'extérieur du 
Québec, le gouvernement pose un geste qui indique 
clairement sa détermination à poursuivre et a dévelop­
per les realizations que le Québec a déjà à son crédit 
depuis cinq ou six ans...(Débats, 13 avril 196?, 
p. 2173).
Administratively, the Department of Intergovernmental 
Affairs was assigned several functions apart from those 
which dealt with federal-provincial matters (Morin in Le 
Devoir, p. I8l). The Minister would take charge of all 
Quebec delegations and agencies abroad; he would be respon­
sible for the administration of all Franco-Quebec ententes 
and, to this end, would collaborate closely with the Depart­
ments of Education and Cultural Affairs; he would conduct 
whatever negotiations might be necessary "lorsque le Quebec 
jugera opportun d'établir, dans les domaines de sa com­
pétence, des relations plus étendues avec l'étranger" (Morin, 
in Le Devoir, p. 181); he would cooperate with federal 
foreign aid officials, for the purpose of sending Quebec 
educators and specialists to developing countries; he would 
actively concern himself with those certain international 
organizations and bodies with which Quebec desired to parti­
cipate; and finally, he would coordinate the interest and 
research of the various Quebec departments in so far as
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these pertained to the numerous international conventions 
which Canada could not implement without provincial assent. 
In addition to these duties, the Minister would preside 
over a cabinet committee of intergovernmental affairs. 
However controversial Bill 33 appeared to English-
speaking Canada, and especially to Ottawa, it was regarded .
- 12
as a natural, logical step in Quebec . It merely harmoni­
zed various executive and legislative efforts. Indeed, for 
Peyton Lyon, other provinces would be wise to follow suit 
(Le Devoir, 20 mars 196?, p. 4).
The advent of May only exacerbated the Ottawa-Quebec 
dispute. In the provincial legislature on May 2, Premier 
Johnson spoke of Quebec's right to represent French Canada 
outside the country; Later that week, he spoke in Montreal 
to the St. Jean Baptiste societies. Here he warned the 
federal government not to conclude international agreements 
covering subjects under provincial jurisdiction, without 
first consulting the provinces; Ottawa could not expect the 
province to delegate any of its powers. Continuing, he 
reprimanded the federal government for its attempts to under­
mine Quebec relations with francophone countries;
12 .in instituant un ministère des Affaires ■ inter­
gouvemementales, le gouvernement du Quebec veut 
assurer l'unité de sa politique en ce qui a trait 
a ses relations et a celles de ces ministères et 
organismes, avec les gouvernements, ministères 
et organismes de l'extérieur du Québec...
(Johnson; Débats, 13 avril 196?, p. 21?0).
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...depuis quatorze mois,«,1e fédéral semble pris de 
la bougeotte dans le domaine des accords, ententes 
ou traités, non pas avec l'Allemagne ou l'Australie, 
mais avec les pays francophones...Des que le Québec 
s'intéresse à un pays, Ottawa accourt et s'empresse 
de le faire dans le giron...(Le Devoir, 8 mai I967,
p. 1).
When, less than twenty-four hours later, the federal govern­
ment announced the signing of a Canadian-Belgian cultural 
agreement which dealt with cultural, academic, scientific 
and technical affairs, Johnson admonished Ottawa once again
13
(Le Devoir, 9 mai 1967, p. 1) .
During the period of May 18 to 22, 1967, Daniel Johnson 
paid an official visit to Paris and opened there a new Dele- 
gation-Genérale. He was well-received by General de Gaulle. 
As a result of several private interviews with the French 
President and with senior members of the French Cabinet, 
the two governments laid the basis for extending projects 
of co-operation. They included a further exchange of tech­
nicians and civil servants, the training in France of Quebec 
technicians in nuclear research, a study for investment, 
and, most controversially, an exchange of radio and tele- 
vision programme through the use of a satellite in whose
13 According to the O.I.I.A.*s Monthly Report (vol. 6 , p. 
68), the signing of this cultural agreement "...prompted Mr. 
Johnson to say that Prince Albert (of Belgium) had been used 
by Ottawa as a dupe to help crush Quebec. There were reports 
that the provincial protocol department had told Ottawa that 
Paul Tremblay, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium, was personne 
non grata in the province and should not accompany the 
Prince. Jean Lesage subsequently criticized the Premier 
for involving the royal couple in an internal dispute...". 
Such unofficial reportings of behind-the-scene movements 
were common throughout this period. Tactics of one-up­
manship and the pre-occupation with symbolic gains were soon 
to be dubbed "La Guerre des Boutons" by Edward McWhinney 
(Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. l42).
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operations Quebec would participate (O.I.I.A,, Monthly 
Report, vol. 6, p. 68). At home, in Quebec, the signifi­
cance of this visit and the value which these programmes 
held for Québécois, did not go unnoticed. Jean-Maro Loger, 
writing in Le Devoir, explained;
...Le Quebec est aux prises avec des problèmes très 
concrets et, à plusieurs égards, aigus, de développe­
ment, d'équipement, de formation des cadres, etc. et 
plus généralement d'affirmation de sa personnalité; 
la France est redevenue une puissance économique, 
scientifique et technique de premier ordre, conduite 
naturellement à s'intéresser de façon particulière - 
mars sans exclusive - à l'avancement des pays parta­
geant sa langue et sa culture, surtout lorsque, de 
sur croit, ils sont issus d'elle-même...(18 mai 196?/ 
p. 4).
Above all else, 196? wns a year in which Canada general­
ly, and Quebec specifically, gained international attention. 
Because Canada was celebrating its centenary, Ottawa re­
ceived a steady flow of congratulatory heads of state, dip­
lomatic functionaries and government officials. Pew failed 
to visit Montreal, host to the international exposition, 
and, while in the province, many met with Johnson as well. 
The July visit by Charles de Gaulle was least typical, most 
provocative, almost historical. (The General's visit is 
well documented in several sources. See particularly, 
Tanturier; Wade, I968, vol. 2; C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, 
vol. 6). Nevertheless, despite his visit and speeches, and
the notice which they attracted, they did not, as a result,
14
accelerate the international activities of Quebec . In
14 Aside from giving international publicity to the 
"aspirations" of Québécois and to the close Franco-Quebec
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relationship, de Gaulle's "Québec libre" speech neither 
dampened nor expedited, in any direct or noticeable fashion, 
the international relations of Quebec. Laurent Chevalier 
disagrees: ,
...le choc psychologique provoque par le voyage du 
général et la volonté des deux gouvernements ont fait 
progresser a pas de géants la coopération franco- 
québécoise...(in Bernard, p. 98)*
To this visit Chevalier attributes the marked increase of 
Franco-Quebec projects. Yet the necessary cause-effect re­
lationship is nowhere evident and is more or less assumed, 
rather than established, by that author. The direct encour­
agement and publicity given to separatist and autonomist 
groups within Quebec is the more conspicuous impact, but an 
impact upon Quebec's (and Canada's) domestic politics.
If anything, the French President's July visit curtailed, 
in the short run, further international initiatives by Quebec. 
It was Ottawa who, increasingly, took advantage of the situ­
ation and especially after the departures of Johnson and de 
Gaulle from the political scene. Indeed, one can notice a 
general shift of focus from "Franco-Quebec relations", to a 
triangular "Ottawa-Quobec-Paris" relationship, to the present 
"Pranco-Canadian" term. (Admittedly, the first expression is 
still common usage, but Quebec no longer dominates relations 
with France, as it once did. This latter development stems 
from a proliferation of Quebec's external efforts to ether 
francophone countries, and not from a concession to Ottawa's 
exclusivity in international affairs.)
The position that de Gaulle's visit and speech had little 
direct bearing upon Quebec's international relations, seems to 
be confirmed by the President's later remarks (July 31 and 
November 2?) which dealt exclusively with Canadian-Quebec 
internal politics. In addition, the position of the Johnson 
government was quite vague:
...Premier Johnson at first seemed mildly critical of 
the de Gaulle performance and appeared to be disassocia­
ting himself from it. Later he denied this and supported 
the General, declaring that he was only saluting the 
freedom of choice of Quebec to select its own political 
and economic destiny...(G.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol.
6, p. 91); 
and later,
...While attending the Confederation of Tomorrow con­
ference in Toronto Premier Johnson of Quebec was 
questioned about the de Gaulle and Pearson statements.
He described the exchange as a private fight between 
de Gaulle and the Prime Minister in which he should 
not get involved...(C.I.I.A,, Monthly Reoort, vol. 6,
p. 131)'
Marcel Rioux paints a similar picture:
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fact, only one further entry Is recorded « on August 23, 
France announced an increase in technical and economic aid 
to Quebec, intended, in the words of de Gaulle, "to help 
the French of Canada to maintain and develop their person­
ality" (O.I.I.A,, Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 92).
Quebec's attendance at the 1968 Conference of African 
and Malagasy Ministers of National Education provided the 
new pivot around which the on-going debate would revolve. 
Pearson, perhaps in anticipation, had written to the Quebec 
Premier as early as December 1, 1967" His letter suggested 
that arrangements be agreed upon between the two governments 
with resoect to la Francophonie generally, which would allow
15
for full Quebec participation in Canadian representation
TVTDaniel Johnson seemed to have trouble keeping up 
with what was going on, and appeared embarrassed by 
de Gaulle's friendliness towards Quebec. Right up to 
his death, Johnson continued to give reassurances to 
both parties of the conflict...(p. 82).
De Gaulle's speeches, if they had blatantly recognized 
the international personality and competence of Quebec, 
would have afforded an opportunity upon which Johnson might, 
have capitalized. However, these speeches made no such 
mention, nor was the Premier in a firm policy position to 
take full advantage. Therefore, we can conclude from this, 
and from Quebec's lack of external activities for the rest 
of 1967, that the visit of de Gaulle played no substantial 
and influential role in the international relations of 
Quebec.
13 This letter is reproduced in Federalism and Interna­
tional Conferences on Education (p. 62-6<J, and reads in 
part ;
...The composition of the Canadian delegation will, of 
course, be dependent on the subject matter of the 
meeting. If such a meeting, for instance, should deal 
with questions of a general character, or with exter­
nal aid, it would then seem desirable for the Secretary 
of State for External Affairs to lead the Canadian de­
legation, which I would hope would also include strong
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The Quebec-Ottawa discussions subsequently arranged, came to
no agreement.
In January 1968, the government of Gabon invited Quebec's 
Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, to an educational 
conference to be held in Libreville, February 3-10, France, 
Quebec and fifteen independent francophone African states 
attended. All delegations were represented at the ministerial 
level. The federal government, having failed in its attempts 
to procure a "Canadian" invitation for a "Canadian" delega­
tion, suspended diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
Gabon. This move was based on the fact that the Gabonese 
government had sent the invitation directly to the government 
of Quebec, and not via the intermediary of Ottawa. For the 
federal government, this was "an exercise in diplomatic 
brinkmanship" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,
16
p. 127) .
representation from Quebec. If, on the other hand, the 
purpose of the conference was, for example, to deal 
exclusively with education, it would then be appropriate 
for the Minister of Education of Quebec to be a member 
of the Canadian delegation, if such was your wish. 
Needless to say, he should occupy within this delegation 
a place appropriate to his position, taking into account 
the nature of the conference. In certain cases, the 
Quebec Minister might well be the head of the Canadian 
delegation...
16 This so-called "Gabon crisis" had all the elements of 
the Theatre of the Absurd, according to McWhinney : the Ga­
bonese, in a note dated January 20, had insisted that the 
invitation was purely personal; Paul Martin, in his reply 
to the Gabonese Ambassador, declared that in attempting to 
interpret the Canadian constitution Gabon had acted in a way 
"which is neither in conformity with international law, nor 
with the maintenance of close and friendly relations between 
our two countries" (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 32);
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Following the Libreville conference, the federal govern­
ment again communicated with Quebec authorities in the hope 
of establishing some formula for the composition of future 
delegations. In a letter of March 8, Pearson re-emphasized 
his dual purpose : to allow Quebec full participation, but 
"in a manner which would be compatible with the continued 
existence of a sovereign and independent Canada" (Federalism 
and International Conferences on Education, p, 66). Other­
wise, if the Gabon affair were repeated in some form or 
fashion, the unified structure of Canada and/or Canada's 
presence abroad would be seriously threatened :
...That structure and that presence would certainly be 
weakened - and ultimately destroyed - if other countries 
invited Canadian provinces to international conferences 
of states, if those provinces accepted the invitation, 
and if the provincial delegates were treated formally as 
representatives of states while the Government of Canada 
was ignored...(Federalism and International Conferences 
on Education, p. 68).
In April 1968, the Conference of African and Malagasy 
Ministers of National Education re-convened in Paris. It came 
and went without an open diplomatic clash between Canada and
Pearson criticized Quebec, while Trudeau, at a March press 
conference, expressed his conviction that France was behind 
the move by Gabon; Gabon suggested that Canada had suspended 
relations to divert Canadian public opinion from the reality 
of the Quebec problem, and furthermore, that Canada had 
reneged on its'offer of aid; lastly, Quebec officials were 
denying the Pearson statement that Quebec had been invited 
to head a Canadian delegation. It was not until June I969» 
that Canada re-established relations with Gabon. At that 
time, a Gabon delegation visited both Ottawa and Quebec, and 
the immediate subject of the Ottawa-Gabon-Quebec quarrels 
"was revealed to have been no more than the exchange of some 
half dozen teachers and students and the provision of tech­
nical assistance in staffing a new public health centre in 
Libreville" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,
p. 128).
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France, even though Pearson and his successor Trudeau, had
both indicated in March that "if France by-passed Ottawa and
invited Quebec to Paris, she could expect the same treatment
as that given the Gabonese" (O.I.I.A,, Monthly Report, vel.
7, P* 4^). Early in the month, the Canadian Prime Minister
had sent a third personal letter to Daniel Johnson still
urging arrangements for a mutually-acceptable delegation.
17
Johnson's only response to the three letters preceded by 
twenty-four hours his government's announcement that Cardinal 
would attend the Paris conference. But the circumstances 
surrounding this conference differed from those which resulted 
in the suspension of Canadian-Gabonese relations. In the first 
place, the meeting was scheduled as "a second stage" of the 
Libreville conference. Secondly, France attempted to empha­
size this natural continuity. Hoping to avoid a dispute with 
Canada, the French government sent "reminders" to previous 
delegates, rather than invitations. Finally, as reported in
17 Partially startled and somewhat angered by the federal 
government's publication (in Federalism and International 
Conferences on Education) of Mr. Pearson's "personal and 
confidential" letters to him, Daniel Johnson tabled his own 
letter in the National Assembly on May 9, I968 (Débats, p. 
1430). In it, the Quebec Premier regretted Pearson's depar­
ture from political life and praised his "openness to dia­
logue"* Concerning the matter at hand, however, Johnson was 
frank :
...There is nowhere in the Canadian constitution a dis­
position so fundamental and over which jurisdiction of 
the provinces has been so firmly established as educa­
tion.,.(Glpbe_and_Moll, May 10 1968, p. 11).
He went on to say that the federal government was using its 
exclusive jurisdiction over international affairs as a 
counter-argument. This would have to be settled by negotia­
tion, In the meantime, Quebec could only assume all its 
responsibilities.
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_the speeches .and statements of Johnson, Cardinal, Pearson 
and Trudeau, the atmosphere in Quebec and in Ottawa seemed
more optimistic (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 43-44).
18
Nevertheless, Ottawa was not completely at ease . Jules 
leger, Canada's Ambassador to Prance, had been summoned home; 
it was not until four days after arriving that his presence 
in Ottawa was known. Following several discussions with 
Messrs. Pearson and Trudeau, and after the Cabinet met to 
study the situation further, the Canadian Ambassador returned. 
With him, Mr, Leger took a note which, on the instructions of 
the Canadian government, was to be delivered personally to 
French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. While 
Mitchell Sharp in Ottawa refused to divulge the contents of 
that note, his comments indicated three elements ; (a) a re­
statement of federal claims of supremacy in international 
relations; (b) regrets that France had not communicated 
through Ottawa to Quebec; and (c).a desire for good relations 
with France (Globe and Mail, May 4 I968, p. 1). This "low- , 
key" note, according to Sharp, would close the entire inci­
dent.
18 The federal government was particularly dismayed by the 
formalities accorded Cardinal *
...The Canadian Government was never officially informed 
of the status of the Quebec delegation at the Paris 
meeting,..it appears from the proceedings of the con­
ference that he (Jean-Guy Cardinal) participated on the 
same basis as other delegates. In the case of the Paris 
session, the Quebec Minister stated after the conference 
that Quebec had participated on the same basis as other 
delegations...(Federalism and International Conferences 
on Education, p. 38).
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In Canada, however, the issue was far from dead. To the 
Montreal Chamber of Commerce, Premier Johnson declared that 
Quebec would continue to set precedents in international re­
lations until Canada had a new constitution respecting the 
provinces' exclusive rights and Canada's general interests.
The recent international diplomacy moves by his government 
were regarded, assured the Premier, as "necessary, legitimate 
and reasonable" by all provincial legislators and a vast 
majority of citizens. Indeed, Quebec, like the other pro­
vinces, had possessed exclusive (and therefore sovereign) 
powers in education since 186?, and while these powers were 
originally exercised only internally, in the modern world, 
this was no longer possible :
...Quebec can no longer fulfil its constitutional tasks 
without extending its internal spheres to the inter­
national level.,,We can no longer act in a vacuum...If 
we want to progress, we must start exchanges and esta­
blish bonds of co-operation with other provinces and 
countries...(Globe and Mail, May ? I968, p. 3I).
Johnson did concede that Ottawa had the responsibility for 
directing Canada's foreign policy in certain traditional 
areas (such as war and peace, monetary policies, tariffs, 
commercial treaties) but, "when it involves education problems, 
what can the federal government truly do or say...It has 
absolutely no power in the matter...".
The reply to Johnson was not long in coming. The next 
two days, on May 8 and 9; the federal government had much to 
say and much to do. A 38-page study. Federalism and Inter­
national Conferences on Education, was released by the Sec­
retary of State for External Affairs and, at a press
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conference In Ottawa, Trudeau made it plain that he would 
consider a Liberal victory at the polls on June 23 as a man­
date to challenge Quebec's international ambitions (Globe and 
Mail, May 9 1968, p. 1 and 8). Later in the month, Trudeau's 
campaign statement on foreign policy stressed the development 
of closer relationships between the federal government and 
francophone countries. New missions, increased aid, more 
cultural programmes were promised (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, 
vol. 7, p. 54).
Quebec, momentarily put on the defensive, found no 
source of strength for its position in the conflict with 
Ottawa when Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba paid a May 
state visit to Ottawa and Montreal. The Tunisian President 
was asked by reporters whether his country would develop 
closer ties with Quebec. His response was brief i until 
proved to the contrary, Quebec belonged to Canada (Globo and 
Mail, May 11 1968, p. 11). Later, in Montreal, he was quoted 
as expressing confidence that Quebec could preserve its 
identity and come into closer contact with French-speaking 
nations without breaking from Canada (C.I.I.A., Monthly 
Report, vol. 7, P* 54).
During July and August I968, there were no confronta­
tions on 8 ministerial level between Quebec and Ottawa. Daniel 
Johnson's July visit to Paris had been cancelled because of 
illness. When the Department of External Affairs was forming 
a Canadian delegation for the UNESCO conference on educational 
planning (Paris, August 6-l4), Quebec declined to
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participate . Later in August, Quebec did send two obser­
vers with the Canadian delegation to. the UN conference on 
exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The agenda in­
cluded discussions of the use of satellites for communica­
tions resource surveys and the impact of space activities 
on education.
There was one additional non-incident. Reportedly (Globe 
and Mail, August 9 1968, P* 3), Quebec had sent a four-man 
mission to certain francophone African states (Gabon, Chad, 
Niger and Senegal) to investigate their needs in education 
and health services. On this, Claude Morin refused comment. 
The absence of a firm federal response seems to imply that, 
at least in the area of foreign aid, Quebec and Ottawa had 
reached some modus vivendi. Both in Federalism and Inter­
national Relations (p. 37-39), and in its supplement, 
Federalism and International Conferences on Education (p. 
42-46 and 32-54), an active provincial role in foreign aid 
was recognized *
...an effective aid programme depends for its realiza­
tion upon full co-operation from the provinces...
...the Federal Government welcomes provincial contri- 
butions...
19 When questioned on the absence of a Quebec representative 
on the delegation, Mr. Morin explained. Because there had 
been no agreement yet on the status of Quebec in participating 
in international conferences, the province, although having 
been invited, refused to join the Canadian delegation. Ne­
gotiations on the rights of the province were still in pro­
gress and if Quebec had accepted Ottawa's invitation it 
could be interpreted to mean that the province agreed to 
Ottawa's viewpoint that Quebec cannot act independently in 
attending international meetings (Le Devoir, 24 juillet 1968,
p. 1).
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...the Federal Government is anxious to (act) in as 
flexible a manner as possible...
...clear recognition should be given to the provincial 
role...
Cardinal had given an indication of his government's posi­
tion in April, when Quebec educational aid to Gabon was 
rumoured. At a press conference, the Minister of Education 
said that Quebec did not consider its plans for educational 
co-operation as competing with Ottawa, but as supplementary 
(Globe and Mail, April 29 1968, p, 2), When compared to 
statements on other issues concerning external relations, 
these remarks appear quite moderate. In any case, the 
reported August mission brought no public rebuke from 
federal government circles.
In late November 1968, questions of the conferenop in 
Niger first arose. The new Quebec Premier, Jean-Jacques 
Bertrand, announced on November 26 that his government had 
received an invitation to participate in the conference, 
and that this invitation had not been obtained through 
Ottawa (le Devoir, 2? novembre I968, p. 1). Mr. Trudeau, in 
the House, announced that his government had received their 
invitation as early as November 17, and that, since it was 
a conference of French-speaking countries in general, the 
Canadian delegation would represent "all Canadians and 
particularly French-speaking Canadians who, as you know, 
do not live only in the province of Quebec but also in 
other provinces..."(Commons Debates, November 27 1968, p.
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32?4) . Until the following February, the question would
remain open.
January 19&9 began yet another year in which Quebec 
actively pursued an international role. A provincial dele­
gation led by Cardinal and Beaudry paid a five-day visit to 
Paris, January 22-2?, in order to strengthen Franco-Quebec 
relations. Upon arrival, the delegation was greeted with 
"full diplomatic and political honours" (Globe and Mail, 
January 2] 1969, P* 1), while the Canadian Ambassador, also 
at the airport, received no special recognition, and more­
over, in what appeared to be a diplomatic snub, was not 
invited to that night's dinner at the Elysee Palace. Having 
attracted much initial attention, the Quebec delegation was 
soon meeting privately with French government leaders.
Their talks resulted in three letters of agreement ; (a) 
work on a possible Franco-Quebec telecommunications satel­
lite; (b) help from Paris for the new University of Quebec; 
and (c) increased promotion of French involvement in the 
provincial economy (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8, p. 10) 
For Mr. Cardinal, these agreements did not constitute 
"accords". Mitchell Sharp, for whom the satellite agreement
20 On the same day, it was reported in the Globe and Mail 
(November 27, p. 3) that Paul Martin might interrupt his 
tour of African countries to visit Niger and discuss plans 
for the conference. Three days later. President Diori of 
Niger held a press conference following his talks with 
Senator Martin. There he expressed Canada's intentions of 
sending a "Canadian" delegation composed of representatives 
from ail French-speaking provinces. He announced at the 
same time that Canada had offered "special aid" to Niger 
(Globe and Mail, November 30 I968, p. 4).
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was of primary concern, expressed similar views :
...The Canadian Government wishes to reserve its posi­
tion with regard to these documents (agreements). It 
intends to study them carefully to determine whether 
they come within the framework of agreements concluded 
by Canada and Prance. In any event, these documents in 
themselves would not constitute international agree­
ments. Moreover, constitutional responsibility in the 
field of telecommunications devolves upon the Govern­
ment of Canada which would mean that every project 
carried out in this field will involve action on the 
part of the Canadian Government. It is, therefore, 
clear that all international co-operation concerning 
satellite communications requires the concurrence and 
full co-operation of the Canadian Government...(Globe 
and Mail, January 23 1969, p. 3).
later, in the House of Commons, after he had received and
studied the letters in question, Mr. Sharp reaffirmed his
previous opinion ;
...these documents could not of themselves constitute 
international agreements, and in this connection I have 
since noted the statements of representatives of the 
Quebec government that the documents wore not Intended 
by Quebec to constitute intergovernmental agreements 
...(Commons Debates, January 31 I969, p. 4981).
The "satellite" letter of agreement was an issue over which 
Quebec apparently wished no confrontation. At his Quebec 
press conference on January 30, Mr. Cardianl was quite con­
ciliatory. Co-operation between France and Quebec could 
lead to a joint launching of a communications satellite, he 
said, "but not before studies and discussions involving the 
federal government" (Globe and Mail, January 3I I969, p. 1)* 
However, he added that, because the other matters were 
exclusively in Quebec's jurisdiction, only the satellite 
proposal would be discussed.
There occurred another event during January which
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brought the federal and Quebec governments close to full 
agreement. This was the Kinshasa conference of education 
ministers, January I3-I8. Prior to that conference, a
series of telegrams exchanged between Messrs. Trudeau and 
Bertrand produced a tentative agreement whereby the Quebec 
delegation, duly identified, would join with other repre­
sentatives of the Canadian delegation. Of special importance
were those proposals set forth by Trudeau in his telegram 
21
of January 8 . They suggested means by which Quebec might
properly assert its own particular identity within the 
larger Canadian delegation. These included suggestions
21 ...The Minister from Quebec will speak on behalf of
Quebec on all matters falling within Quebec's consti­
tutional jurisdiction. The delegates from the other 
provinces will do likewise. As far as the Canadian de­
legation as such is concerned, its opinions will be 
expressed by the chairman or co-chairmen...
...Quebec's presence may be identified in the following 
manner ; (a) during the opening or closing sittings, 
the chairman of the sitting or the other speakers may 
identify Quebec and the other provinces by appropriate 
mention; (b) the documents produced by Quebec or the 
other provinces on subjects within their constitu­
tional jurisdiction will be brought forward in their 
name and will bear their distinctive mark; nevertheless, 
these documents will be placed before the conference 
by the Canadian delegation in a dossier emanating from 
this delegation and containing all the documents sub­
mitted by the provinces; (c) the automobile of Quebec's 
delegates will bear a plate with the double mention 
Canada and Quebec and a miniature Quebec flagj (d) the 
flag of Quebec may be raised over the hotel in which 
the Quebec minister resides; (e) Quebec's flag will be 
displayed in the conference room, or outside this room, 
where the various flags are hung, provided that it is 
in company with the flag of Canada, precedence being 
given to the latter...
...In the event of a possible vote at the conference, 
Canada, including Quebec, will have only one vote. If 
the members of the delegation cannot reach an agreement, 
Canada will ab8tain...(G.I,I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8, 
p. ij).
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regarding documentation, the display of flags, voting pro­
cedures, chairmanship, and matters of general diplomatic 
import. Reporting from Kinshasa, the Globe and Mail 
(January 13 1969, P* 2?) confirmed that the actual arrange­
ments at the conference followed generally the suggestions 
made by Prime Minister Trudeau, but that the details had 
been worked out only after the federal and Quebec represen­
tatives, travelling separately, had arrived in the city.
If the Kinshasa formula for representation implied a 
modicum of harmony between the positions of Ottawa and of 
Quebec, the federal-provincial constitutional conference 
confirmed it. On February 12, Quebec Premier Bertrand tabled 
his government's Document de travail sur les relations avec 
l'étrangor. Quebec was clearly not retreating from its 
demand for an international role. Yet the proposed ground 
rules for international conferences (p. 26-28) embodied 
much of the Kinshasa agreement. In addition, where matters 
of provincial jurisdiction wore concerned, the paper recog­
nized the federal government's right to veto agreements 
between provinces and foreign governments, but only if such 
agreements were proven incompatible with Canada's general 
foreign policy (p. 23), Quebec, in return, asked for prior 
consultation when Ottawa embarked upon international agree- 
monts in the fields of concurrent or full provincial juris­
diction. It was evident, then, that bargaining had begun 
and, as Quebec wished, on a constitutional level.
The question of appropriate representation at the Niamey
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conference, February 17-20, was the subject of much discus­
sion at this same time. (The conference was to discuss the 
possibility of establishing an international agency to co­
ordinate aid and exchange amongst French-speaking nations; 
as previously mentioned, both the Quebec and Canadian 
governments had received invitations to participate.) Marc 
Lalonde and Claude Morin met early in the month to discuss 
arrangements, but Prime Minister Trudeau in reply to a 
Commons question, assured the House that the delegation's 
composition would not be similar to that of Kinshasa :
...In Niamey, the conference will deal with several 
subjects over which the federal government has juris­
diction. Therefore, we intend to send federal ministers 
as delegates, as opposed to Kinshasa where the con­
ference was on education,a subject which concerns only 
indirectly the federal government. That is why we sent 
officials there while all the provinces sent ministers 
...(Commons Debates, February 3 1969, P* 5175)*
Within a week, Bertrand announced that "thé Quebec delega­
tion will go to Niger and join the Canadian delegation and 
there it will represent Quebec on matters of education and 
culture" (Globe and Mail, February 11 I969, P* 3)* Agreement 
on participation at the conference had been reached. While 
Marcel Masse would head the Quebec delegation, the federal 
Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, would be sole leader 
of the "all-Canadian" delegation. In this capacity, Mr. 
Pelletier would exercise the single Canadian vote; but, in 
event of disagreement among the delegates, he would abstain. 
The federal announcement stressed, however, that "the ar­
rangements between Quebec and Ottawa would not bind either
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government in the search for a permanent solution to the 
dispute over dealings on matters of foreign affairs within 
provincial jurisdiction" (O.I.I.A., Monthly Reoort, vol. 8, 
p. 48).
At Niamey, the conference agreed to establish an 
Agencé de cooperation culturelle et technique des pays 
francophones, and Jean-Marc leger (an able advocate of 
Quebec's international role) was appointed provisional exe­
cutive secretary to draft a charter. The Canadian federal 
government, for its part, threw strong financial support 
behind the embryonic agency. Not only did it pledge pp to 
thirty per cent of the budget, but Mr. Pelletier also an­
nounced that the volume of Canadian aid to francophone 
countries would be vastly expanded in the next few years 
(External Affairs, vol. XXI, no. 3, u, 21?).
22
Nevertheless, during the conference, even as before , 
disagreement arose over federal and Quebec representations. 
On the official list of governments represented at the con­
ference, Canada and Quebec were given separate listings.
22 From the statements of Trudeau and Bertrand, firm
agreement had been reached. However, according to the C.I. 
I.A.'s Monthly Reoort, Mr. Marcel Masse held a somewhat dif­
ferent opinion:
...(on February 13)...Mr. Masse was reported by the 
Canadian Press as saying that there would be no link 
between the Quebec and the federal delegations and 
that not having co-chairmen meant Quebec would not 
have to consult "Ottawa" on matters involving culture 
and education. Spokesmen for the federal government 
denied the assertion by Mr. Masse, saying that the 
agreement made by Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier 
Bertrand was specific on this point...(vol. 8, p. 48).
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thus producing a series of procedural disputes concerning 
the identification and status of Canadian and Quebec dele­
gates. Not until the following year, when the founding con­
ference met, were these problems solved.
The summer of 19&9 came on an optimistic note. A new 
policy of detente between Quebec and Ottawa on the one hand, 
and Prance and Ottawa on the other, seemed to be taking 
shape. Premier Bertrand revealed that, in July, Claude 
Morin had delivered to French President Pompidou a personal 
message in which the Quebec Premier expressed his desire to 
maintain close relations with France without neglecting the 
relations with Canada, he Devoir interpreted this as a 
break with the politics and strategy of the late Daniel 
Johnson (19 août 1969, p. 1); with similar thoughts, the 
federal government warmly welcomed the Bertrand statement 
(Le Devoir, 20 août I969, P* 1)» Pragmatism, reasonableness 
and the elements of commonsense and mutual co-operation were 
being emphasized by Sharp federally, by Bertrand provin- 
cially. The de Lipkowski affair brought this to an end.
From the moment Mr..Jean de Lipkowski arrived in Quebec 
on October 9, 1969, Ottawa, Quebec and Paris plunged once 
again into the throes of controversy. The French Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs was in Quebec on the invitation 
of Marcel Masse, then Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental 
Affairs, and was heading a five-man delegation of top French 
government officials. Although he had been formally in­
vited to visit Ottawa (the invitation having been renewed
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on three separate occasions), Mr. de lipkowski declined.
His non-acceptance, he insisted (le Devoir, 11 octobre I969, 
p. 3)» did not constitute an affront to Ottawa since his 
visit was made within the framework of the existing Ottawa- 
Paris-Quebec arrangements (i.e. the accord cadre of 19&5)' 
For many, this was a deliberate snub to the Canadian govern­
ment. The controversy began.
On October l4, de Lipkowski spoke of plans for the 
Franoo-Quebec telecommunications satellite;
...he,..declared that such a project was authorized by 
the Canada-France "umbrella agreement", by reason of 
the fact that the Canadian constitution of 186? was 
silent on telecommunications and the fact also that 
the France-Quebec project had a cultural and educa­
tional bent - matters within provincial competence... 
(McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p.
144) 23
This prompted Prime Minister Trudeau to characterize the 
French official as "impertinent", "impolite", and "grossly 
misinformed" (this latter in particular reference to his 
comments on the Canadian constitution), and to threaten a
23 When contrasted with other statements he is reported 
to have made, this seems quite conservative. Compare, for 
example, the following: -
...he said Prance must help Quebeckers in their "lonely 
battle" for national identity and could no longer re­
main indifferent to Quebeckers' struggle for survival..,
...de lipkowski told a press conference that "There's 
been no change" in the French foreign policy with res­
pect to Ottawa and Quebec since the departure of 
President de Gaulle. He said that the decision to 
bypass Ottawa had been made by the French government, 
that a decision to visit Ottawa after the election of 
President Pompidou might have indicated that France 
now recognized the federal government's "monopoly" 
over Franco-Quebec relations...(C.I.I.A., Monthly 
Report, vol. 8, p. 233)»
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change, or if necessary, a denunciation of the Franco-Cana- 
dian "umbrella agreement". Mr. Masse defended his guest, 
accusing the federal government of creating unnecessary pro­
blems through its lack of flexibility. French Foreign Mini­
ster Maurice Schumann also supported his official.
Accusations, counter-accusations and rumours, either 
directly or indirectly related to the affair, continued 
throughout October and November. In December, the de lip- 
kowski affair ended as suddenly as it had begun*
.k.The French government apparently decided quietly to 
ignore the Ottawa protest note over the de Dipkowski 
affair, and Ottawa, in turn, apparently decided 
quietly to ignore the French government's ignoring of 
its protest note; and the Quebec government, for its 
part, chose not to involve itself further, publicly, 
in this latest Ottawa-Paris conflict...(McWhinney in 
Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 149). 24
} By far the best account of this affair occurs in Mc- 
Whinney's article (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p, l42- 
130). His observations and conclusions are worthy of note* 
...The de lipkowski affair itself seems to have 
stemmed from political events beyong the immediate 
control either of the professional Foreign Ministers 
in Ottawa or in Paris, or of the Quebec Premier...
(p. 118)
...it was hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that 
an undue amount of time and energy had been invested
by all three capitals - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - in
an affair of disproportionately slight social value; 
and that, whatever issues of constitutional principle 
may have been involved at the beginning, the war had 
now become trivial and farcical...no one of the parties 
could now emerge with much political profit or advan­
tage...(p. 149;.
In substance, the de Lipkowski affair played an insignificant 
part in the international relations of Quebec. In form, 
however, it typified the politics through which Quebec 
struggled to assure itself of an international role. Often 
third or even fourth parties were drawn into what was es­
sentially a domestic, an Ottawa-Quebec, or federal-provin­
cial, dispute. The trivial, farcical, ill-mannered extremes 
to which all parties resorted in the pursuit of symbolic
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The trend towards reasonableness which had begun in 
the summer resumed in December 19&9' Schumann and Sharp 
met'at the Brussels NATO Council meeting and, after a long 
private discussion, apparently agreed to avoid similar in­
cidents in the future (le Devoir, 6 deoembre I969, p.2). 
Bertrand and Sharp had previously agreed on arrangements for 
Quebec-Ganadian representation at the up-coming Paris con­
ference of francophone education ministers (le Devoir, 26 
novembre I969, p* I6).
...Everything thus pointed finally to a polite and 
essentially pragmatic accommodation among the three 
parties - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - reflecting at 
once the commonsense and moderation of their principal 
spokesmen in recent weeks, federal External AfTairs
Minister Sharp, Quebec Premier Bertrand, and French 
Foreign Minister Schumann...(%cWhinney in Confedera­
tion Challenge, vol. 2, p. I50).
By 1970, at least the question of Quebec's attendance 
at educational conferences seemed to be closed. Following 
the conclusion of arrangements for the conference at Mauri­
tania, February 23-26, Mr. Sharp declared to the House that 
"the principles that were followed in the past for atten­
dance at educational ministers' conferences are well esta­
blished and will be followed" (International Canada, 1970, 
p. 31)' Quebec led the Canadian delegation.
Despite the apparent solution to this problem, there 
remained considerable disagreement over several issues sur­
rounding the constitutional conference (for the Agence de
gains, fortunately gave way to a "new recognition of the 
merits of co-operative federalism" (p. 116). If the de 
lipkowski.affair produced anything of benefit, it was cer­
tainly this.
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coopération), to be held in Niamey, March 16-20. Particular 
negotiations which had begun in January, continued through 
February and into March. (One will recall that general dis­
cussions began at the first Niamey conference one year be­
fore.) Proposals and counter-proposals wore exchanged be­
tween federal and provincial officials, and finally, between 
Trudeau and Bertrand. That such lengthy and laborious bar­
gaining should precede this Niamey conference, did not sur­
prise one observer, Jean-Charles Bonenfant. For him, it 
was very much a "rapprochement historique"*
ja conférence...a été pour le Québec l'occasion de 
faire valoir ses désirs d'activité extérieure car elle 
posait les trois problèmes classiques d'une telle 
activité, celui de la representation, celui de la sig­
nature d'un accord et celui^de la participation à une 
organisme international..«(Etudes Internationales, 
juin 1970, p. 86).
On March 13, final arrangements had been concluded* 
Quebec delegates would be part of the Canadian delegation 
which Gerard Pelletier would again head; the leader of the 
Quebec delegation would act as vice-chairman; Canada would 
vote with one voice, or abstain; but, in matters of provin­
cial jurisdiction, the Quebec delegate would speak in the 
name of his government; Quebec would be allowed to display 
its flag in company with that of Canada, with the latter 
taking precedence; a similar procedure applied with respect 
to name plaques; Mr. Pelletier would sign the charter first, 
in the name of Canada, followed by the signatures of pro­
vincial representatives; Quebec, like the other interested 
provinces, would be adequately represented on the commissions
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and committees of the Agency, according to the subject-
matters discussed; and lastly, Canada and Quebec would share
equally the Canadian delegation's financial contribution to
the budget (Etudes Internationales, juin 1970, p. 88-89).
At the conference, however, one hurdle remained:
...la Prance...avait demandé que oo soit non seulement 
les Etats souverains qui fassent partie de l'organi­
sation mais aussi les gouvernements, les institutions 
et les associations dont la compétence sqrait com­
patible avec la vocation de l'Agence...(Etudes Inter­
nationales, juin 1970, p. 89).
This proposai, which would have allowed Quebec full member­
ship, was opposed by the Canadian federal government, as 
the latter "reserved the right to deal with foreign coun­
tries" (International Canada, 1970, p. 6I). Following a 
prolonged debate, whereby the Agency's existence was at
25
times placed in jeopardy, an agreement was reached . Bu^
neither Quebec nor Ottawa spoke in terms of victory or do-
26
feat at the conclusion of the conference . The compromise
25 This agreement constitutes article 3, subsection 3 of 
the Agency's Charter:
...Dans le plein respect de la/Souverainete et de la 
competence internationale des Etats membres, tout 
gouvernement peut être admis comme gouvernement parti­
cipant aux institutions, aux activités et aux pro- 
gngmmes de l'Agence, sous réserve de l'approbation de 
l'Etat membre dont relève le territoire sur lequel le 
gouvernement participant concerné exerce son autorité 
et selon les mqdalites convenues entre ce gouvernement 
et celui de l'Etat membre... ^
Both documents, la Convention relative a l'Agence de 00- 
opération culturelle et technique and la Charte de l'Agence 
ge coopération culturelle et techique, are reproduced in 
Etudes Internationales, juin 1970, p. 91-101.
26 Michel Roy, who was at Niamey, explained the reasons 
for this restraint:
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had been semi-satisfactory for both parties: Ottawa en-
sured that Canadian representation as an international en- 
tity would not be split; Quebec succeeded, nevertheless, in 
joining for the first time, an international organization.
For McWhinney, this second Niamey conference "may.,, 
have been in the nature of the last storm, preceding a final 
calm" (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 13^). Events to 
date, having been devoid of those verbal diplomatic/consti­
tutional battles of the past, seem to verify that statement. 
Particularly since the April 1970 election in Quebec, the 
principles of federal comity have formed the basis for re­
lations between Quebec and la francophonie, and Canada and 
la francophonie.
The new Quebec Premier, Robert Bourassa, has given the 
external relations of his province a new direction. While 
not minimizing cultural relations - "les relations cul­
turelles avec la France sont fondamentales" (Bourassa/
Québec:, p. 31) - Bourassa has given economic issues first, 
priority:
...il faut "asseoir la coopération culturelle sur la 
coopération économique"...(Bourassa/Québec!, p. 31).
The previous pre-occupation with symbols has therefore suf­
fered, having been replaced by more pragmatic goals and issues,
...ce n'est pas seulement par prudence, parce qu'ils 
se trouvaient à l'étranger, ou par diplomatie pour 
éviter de heurtep les autres pa^s participants, que 
le secrétaire d'Etat et le secrétaire-général du 
Conseil exécutif du Québec se sont abstenus soigneuse­
ment d'employer ce vocabulaire. C'est surtout que la 
réalité de l'entente, les conditions dans^lesquelles 
elle a été réalisé et, enfin, la portée veritable de 
l'accord-ne le justifiaient pas...(Le Devoir, 23 mars
1970, p. 1 ).
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In conclusion, Quebec's presence internationally has
not been changed, but rather "normalized":
...on peut donc conclure que rien d'essentiel n'est 
changé 'dans les relations extérieures du Québec, mais 
que par suite de la presence h Québec d'un nouveau 
gouvernement qui coincide avec une transformation de 
l'attitude de la France elles semblent devoir prendre 
une orientation différente qui sera moins politique et 
plus économique et qui se précisera sans coup d'éclat 
a l'intérieu^ des structures actuelles du fédéralisme 
canadien...(Etudes Internationales, septembre 1970, 
p. 76)'
The normalization of Quebec's external relations has 
not, however, been accompanied by recognition, or full ac­
ceptance, on the part of the federal government. The open 
diplomatic clashes and covert backstage manoeuverings (which 
so often characterized and accompanied the international re­
lations of Quebec from 1965-1970) might have been halted, 
but the underlying issues which gave rise to those battles 
continue. The essential aspirations of Quebec have not 
changed, nor has the character of Canadian federalism.
This chapter, it must be pointed out, has dealt largely 
with the governmental process; that is, the international 
relations of Quebec were viewed from the governmental, the 
administrative-legislative point of view. To say, therefore, 
that 1965 was a watershed is to indicate only a change in 
the governmental process, a change whereby the spacial trans­
mission of culture was, relatively speaking, institutiona­
lized. Administrative and legislative structures were 
created, manpower employed, and monies allocated for the
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establishment and orderly functioning of Quebec relations 
with other francophone societies.
The much broader political process of Quebec was not 
mentioned. In terms of 1965, this process, being composed 
of different constituencies, is less easily characterized 
as having undergone any profound transformation. While the 
views of some political constituencies outpaced those of the 
government, others invoked restraint. But since it is in 
the nature of democratically-elected parties, particularly 
those of Canada, to tread as wide a path between extremes 
as is politically possible, then one must assume that the 
governmental process is a rough reflection of its environ­
ment, The views of such popular but divergent Quebec con­
stituencies - such as those represented by Rene Levesque and 
Jean Drapeau - are not so much reconciled as inevitably en­
compassed by the governmental process. This is only to say 
that in a pluralist society- and Quebec is one - over­
lapping occurs.
With respect to the international relations of Quebec, 
the similar orientation of the Liberal and Union Nationale 
governments of the period seems to imply a fairly broad con­
sensus within the political process. Tactics, strategies, 
means to short-term goals, are always in dispute. This is 
the realm of day-to-day politics. For a society to progress 
and develop, however, there must exist general agreement as 
to "ends" before meaningful action can be had. It is from 
such premises that governments proceed. The premises upon
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which the governments of Quebec have acted are those of the
27
Quiet Revolution : firstly, that cultural-national sur­
vival is of value; secondly, that, being endangered by tech­
nology and the force of numbers, cultural-national survival 
is better ensured by extroversion and cultural reinforcement 
rather than by the introversion and isolation of the past; 
thirdly, since the economy and culture are interdependent, 
that a French-speaking economy is equally necessary; fourthly,
that such economic and cultural particularism demands de-
28
centralization, or maximum autonomy for Quebec ; and lastly, 
that the state is best equipped to act as agent in these 
tasks, that is, that the state has a singularly positive role
29
to play
27 That is why, in reference to the discussion above, I965 
is described as a watershed for Quebec's governmental process 
and not the political process. It is more likely, and it is 
generally accepted, that the transformation of the latter 
was gradual and preceded that of the former.
28 This is according to the given general political struc­
ture, federalism. For some, particularly separatists, this' 
is no problem. But, while separatists may dominate certain 
occupational and/or age groups, they do not comprise the 
majority to date. The argument advanced here is that the 
governmental process is operating with a rough approximation 
of the political mean in mind.
29 These ideational inputs from the political process oc­
curred with the rise of Quebec's new middle class. As the 
politico-cultural pressures of the 1960's forced a growing 
number of this self-assertive and informed group into the 
provincial bureaucracy, the governmental organization changed. 
The Department of Public Instruction is a case in point. The 
increasing secularization of society and of the political 
process in particular prompted the creation of a Department
of Education. Moreover, the infusion of lay officials brought 
ideas which inclined to extend rather than to restrict, out­
side contacts and co-operation.
This example only serves to emphasize the close
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Ail these have, of course, been mentioned. They are a 
subtle blend of short- and long-term goals, and thus con- 
stitute both means and ends. The actions of Quebec to effect 
those means, to achieve those ends, have also been recounted; 
the drive for an international role - an expression of extro- 
version; the conclusion of cultural, technical and economic 
co-operative programmes - a manifestation of cultural-economic 
reinforcement. But where external affairs are concerned, 
attempts at legitimate decentralization have so far been in 
vain. The federal government maintains a firm position that 
it possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matters which 
transcend Canadian boundaries, that Canada's international 
personality and foreign policy are indivisible. The federal 
and Quebec governments thus confront one another with cul­
tural and political arguments, in the hope of settling the 
dispute once and for all on a constitutional level.
relationship existing between the political and governmental 
processes, whereby the inputs from the former directly affect 
the outputs of the latter.
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ARGUMENTS
The federal government, particularly under Pearson and 
under his successor Trudeau, had not sat idle during the 
1960's when the governmental and political processes of 
Quebec were commanding great concern. The Royal Commission 
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963; 
a policy of "co-operative federalism" was pursued until 1968. 
Both were designed to correct the inequities of Canada's 
majority-minority (English-French) relations; each attempted, 
in its own way, to find solutions to the problems and accu­
sations raised in the Quiet Revolution's aftermath. Yet 
while these, and other similar measures, sought to,establish 
between Ottawa and Quebec more just modi vivendi et ooerandi 
domestically, the question of external involvement was quite 
another matter. Indeed, the international implications which 
flowed from Quebec's desire to use fully its legislative pre­
rogatives, had no small impact upon the federal government.
Martin and Pearson, especially after I965, were more 
emphatic on the bilingual and bicultural qualities of Cana­
dian foreign policy;
...the government of Canada represents all of Canada 
on the International plane and...we are anxious to use our 
powers in the foreign affairs field to promote and further 
the interests of all Canadians, including, of course, those 
relating to our unique French-speaking heritage...(Martin 
in Morrison, p.4).
-  78 -
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Francophone Africa was suddenly in the spotlight of
1
Canadian foreign aid . Furthermore, in the face of accusa- 
tions that the Department of External Affairs did not rep­
resent the interests of French Canadians, either at home or 
abroad, the government moved to recruit more Québécois, and 
to transform the Department into a more truly bilingual 
unit. (On this development, see Gilles lalande; The Depart- 
ment of External Affairs and Biculturalism: Diplomatic
Personnel and Language Use; and Federalism and International 
Relations, p. 41-42.)
During this whole period, and particularly from 19&5 
on, there existed a continuing see-saw effect between Ottawa 
and Quebec over the letter's jurisdiction regarding treaty- 
making and treaty-implementation. That Quebec's actions 
were legally valid was denied by Ottawa as strongly as it
1 In the first half of the 1960's, $17 million was allo­
cated to Commonwealth Africa, compared to Francophone 
Africa's $1.5 million (CIDA Annual Review, 1969). Today, 
1969-70, the balance is sharply reversed with allocations 
to Francophone Africa exceeding by $10 million those to Com­
monwealth Africa ($34 and $24 millions respectively). In 
fact, bilateral aid allocations to this French-speaking area 
far exceed that to any other region (except Asia as a whole) 
and easily surpass the amounts given to any other two regions 
combined - excluding, again, Asia (International Canada,
1970, p. 173-174).
That such federal attention is directly attributable to 
events in Quebec is the view of several authors - Atkey, 
Matthews, McWhinney and Morrison, Of these, Matthews is 
most blunt:
...the extension of Canada's aid programme to French 
speaking Africa was not motivated by a moral concern 
for balancing the scales of justice. Rather, this 
decision was the by-product of a Canadian domestic 
crisis. Building bridges with la Francophonie was 
seen as one way of dealing with the French Canadian 
problem...(in International Journal, p. 125).
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was supported by Quebec. Indeed, it was (and continues to 
be) a debate of great importance, for, as Atkey points out, 
"...at stake is not only the internal maintenance of the 
Canadian federation, but the role of Canada in the inter­
national community.. (in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2,
p. 153).
It may be useful therefore to put forward the main argu- 
2
ments on each side, not because the basic issue is capable 
of a purely legal solution^ but rather for consideration as 
to their contemporary relevance, legal authority and poli- 
tical viability.
One of the primary complications in this matter is the
virtual silence of the British North America (BNA) Act as to
3
the separation of treaty-making and treaty-implementation .
2 The politico-legal arguments (dealing with provincial 
treaty-making and treaty-implementation) have been well docu­
mented in the past few years, and it would serve little pur­
pose in outlining them all here. However, I refer the reader 
to several of the better discussions, most of which are in­
corporated by the following section; Atkey in International 
Journal; Lyon and Atkey in Canadian Constitutional Law in â 
Modern Perspective; Laskin, Delisle, McWhinney (vol. 1) and 
McWhinney, Atkey"Tvol. 2) in The Confederation Challenge.
For the positions of the federal and Quebec governments, see 
Jean-Pierre Coyer in Commons Debates, (30 October 1969# p. 
284-289); Federalism and International Relations, and its 
supplement, Federalism and International Conferences on Edu- 
oation (federal position); and Paul Gerin-Lajoie in Débats 
(13 avril 1967* p./ 2173-2178), Document de Travail sur les 
Relations avec l^Etranger, as well aslLes Pouvoirs Extérieurs 
du Quebec,
3 The importance of the BNA Act in the determination of 
this question is underlined by the fact "that intemational 
law cannot by itself decide whether or not a member of a 
federal union can make a treaty. Int e m a t  i onal law looks.
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Firstly, while section 132 does relate to federal obliga-
tions arising from treaties between the British Empire and
4
other foreign countries , it is contended that the Statute
of Westminister (1931) negated those necessary powers of
5
federal performance * Nowhere else does the BNA Act speak of 
the making or implementation of treaties. Thus, the gover­
ning rule has become the principle laid down by the Labour 
Conventions Case in 1937*
...for the purposes of.,.the distribution of legislative 
powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is 
no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The dis­
tribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a 
treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so 
will the legislative power of performing it be ascer­
tained...(Laskin in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, 
p. 109).
The exclusive right to implement treaties within its own 
constitutionally-defined jurisdiction, has implied, to Quebec
in the first instance, to the constitution of the state in 
question to determine the treaty-making capacity" (Federalism 
and International Relations, p. 12). Both Quebec and Ottawa" 
recognize thisZ In fact, argues Brossard, nothing prevents 
the federal government from granting wide powers to Canadian 
provinces; international law could do nothing but accept any 
change in the Canadian constitution (p. 227).
t ...The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have
all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obli­
gations of Canada or of any other Province thereof, as 
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, 
arising under Treaties between the Empire and such 
Foreign Countries...
) ...No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the commencement of this Act shall extend or be 
deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of 
that Dominion...(Statute of Westminster, 1931» section 
4).
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at least, the equally legal right to negotiate and sign 
treaties on provincial subjects. This would seem to have 
some validity, being as it is an extension of what Justice 
Laskin calls "a long-established constitutional doctrine"; 
namely, that the distribution of legislative power between 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures involves a cor­
relative distribution of the accompanying executive or pre­
rogative power (in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p.103).
This contention regarding the inseparability of execu­
tive and legislative powers (i.e. of treaty-making and 
-implementation) is further reinforced by the Liquidators 
and Bonanza Creek oases of 1892 and 1916 respectively.
Whereas the former held that "the provinces were independent 
and autonomous with the Lieutenant Governors having all the 
powers of the royal prerogative necessary for provincial 
purposes", the latter supplemented this by asserting that 
"the distribution of powers under the grant of executive 
authority follows the distribution under the grant of legis­
lative powers in the BNA Act" (Atkey in International Journal, 
p. 262). Using such weapons, the Quebec government argues;
...qu'en matière d'exercice de la prérogative royale, 
le texte des lettres patentes (^..émises au Gouverneur- 
général en 1947...) ne peut prévaloir à l'encontre de 
la constitution et que celle-ci implique un partage de
la prérogative qui correspond au partage de la com- 
pétence législative. ^
...D'autre part, l'application a cette question des 
principes généraux gouvernant l'exercice de la pré­
rogative royale entraine la conclusion inévitable que 
les provinces jouissent, en vertu de la constitution 
actuelle, du droit de conclure des traités avec les 
autres pays dans les matières qui sont de leur ressort 
législatif...(Document de Travail, 1969, p. 18, p.
20-21).
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There are, in addition to these constitutional argu­
ments, the recent precedents set by Quebec to which some 
would point as suggesting that a de facto provincial com­
petence in the international sphere is being created by evo­
lution, or to which others would refer as establishing pro­
vincial competence to make international agreements through 
constitutional custom and practice. This applies not only
to matters of competence, but to Quebec's international per-
6
sonality as well . Paul Gerin-Lajoie, having reviewed Que­
bec's international initiatives, held such an opinion:
...Cette action internationale du Québec, déjà impor­
tante, implique en quelque sorte que le Québec possède 
une personnalité internationale. Or, on a contesté, 
non seulement que le Quebéc ait cette personnalité, 
mais aussi qu'il puisse même en être doté un jour... 
(Débats, 13 avril 196?, p. 2174).
The federal legal argument, on the other hand, appears 
to be substantially better founded. It too is based on the 
devolution of foreign affairs power from Britain to Canada, 
as the result of a series of Canadian external participations:
6 The recognition of one's international personality is 
dependent upon the recognition of one's external sovereignty. 
Brossard argues that Quebec participates in Canada's inter­
national sovereignty; / ,
...ce n'est pas l'Etat fédéral qui détient la^souve­
raineté extérieure mais la fédération, c'est-à-^ire 
l'ensemble constitué par l'Etat fédéral et les Etats 
provinciaux...(p. 23I).
Although he does not treat Quebec's international personality 
specifically, his argument leads logically to the conclusion 
that if Quebec participates in Canada's international 
sovereignty, then it surely also shares Canada's inter­
national personality. This conclusion is implicit.
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Washington Treaty (1871), Treaty of Versailles (1919),
Halibut Fisheries Treaty (1923), Imperial Conference (1926), 
Statute of Westminister (1931)» and the declaration of war 
(1939)• As well, foreign affairs generally (by definition) 
cannot be considered seriously among "matters of a merely 
local or private nature" (BNA Act, section 92); furthermore, 
since it is not "assigned exclusively to the legislatures of 
the provinces", international relations, as a residual power, 
falls to the federal government. Section 3 of the Statute 
of Westminster gives "the Parliament of a Dominion,..full 
power to make laws having extraterritorial operation"; and 
the Letters Patent of 19^7 would seem to include, among 
other powers, the transfer of the treaty-making prerogative 
(formerly vested exclusively in the Queen by section 9 of 
the BNA Act) to the Governor-General (in Council),
The federal government also countered that argument of 
Quebec which employed the Labour Conventions Case. The judg­
ment dealt not with treaty-making, but rather with the imple­
mentation of treaties. (The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council clearly stated that it wished to express no opinion 
on the treaty-making issue. See Atkey in International 
Journal, p. 266). Federal advocates point to the decision 
as handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada (before it was 
appealed to the J.G.P.C.), to the belated dissent of Lord 
Wright (who, as a member of the Privy Council, sat on the 
case), and to Chief Justice Kerwin's statement (in the course 
of his judgment in Francis v. The Queen, 1956) that "it may
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be necessary...to consider in the future the judgment of the 
Judicial Committee in the Labour Conventions Case" (Laskin 
in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p. 111).
However firm the federal position may be when drawing 
upon internal strengths, it is buttressed further by referen­
ces to international law. Here, "recognition" plays a large 
role; and it was the federal government, not provincial 
governments, that was recognized by other sovereign states 
as having power to conduct foreign affairs - first by Britain, 
then by the United States, by others, by the United Nations,
It is a position which has gone, until recently, unchallenged 
at home and unchallenged abroad. There is, as well, the un­
written legal rule which regards the central government of 
a federation as responsible for any default on an international 
agreement, whether that tort is committed by the central 
government, or by a component unit. According to federal 
proponents, this places Ottawa in a potentially unfair posi­
tion, particularly if Ottawa is to be required to remedy pro­
vincial breaches of international agreements over which it 
has no control. Moreover, were such a provincial default to 
occur, it would seriously detract from Canada's international 
integrity. The federal government, they conclude, by shoul- 
the responsibility, must also control the relations (Atkey
 ^ 7
in International Journal, p. 267) .
7 Quebec proponents use this same argument. If the pro­
vinces possessed the necessary executive (treaty-making) 
power to coincide with the present legislative (treaty- 
implementation) powers, then not only would Canada be
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Yet despite the federal government's stronger legal 
argumentation, there is no rigidity about its conclusions. 
Indeed, they are quite flexible, game for negotiation, open 
for revision. Their proposals for co-operation present a 
stark reminder that the issue's solution lies not in legali­
ties, but rather in the politics of federal-provincial (or 
specifically Ottawa-Quebec) relations:
...neither centralization to the exclusion of other 
priorities nor decentralization to the point of dis­
solution is desirable or necessary. What is of parti­
cular importance is to improve and extend the present 
framework, on the basis of the very broad range of 
options which is available...
...Within these limits, it is not the intention of 
the Government to fix upon or crystallize any one 
formula for improvement or adjustment in existing 
arrangements. Those which are referred to above (in 
the text) are open to consideration and it is the 
Government's hope that they will receive close atten­
tion and examination in all interested quarters. For 
its part, the Government will be prepared to consider 
the further development of any such procedures which 
are found to be of general interest, as well as al­
ternatives which may be proposed, with a view to 
achieving a fully effective design for future co­
operation...(Federalism and International Relations, 
p. 48).
Indeed, both federal and provincial legal arguments lead
8
away from rather than toward the judicial system , placing 
the solution within the political arena.
indemnified against such provincial torts, but it would also 
participate more fully in international affairs (Brossard 
et al., p. 85).
8 This is not surprising when one considers the suspicion 
with which provincial governments view the constitutional 
arbiter, the Supreme Court of Canada. At the same time, 
however, the federal government has no assurance that,if 
the question were put before the Court, a decision (or 
opinion) favourable to Ottawa would be made. The decision, 
according to Peyton Lyon, could easily go either way (Le 
Devoir, 20 mars 1967» p. 4).
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Quebec's political objectives are shaped fundamentally
by its cultural-national particularisme, by the value placed
upon those particularisms, and therefore upon their survival;
...We believe that there is in Canada, in a sociological 
sense, a nation of French speech, whose home is in Que­
bec. This nation has every intention of continuing 
its self-assertion by obtaining...all the instruments 
required for its development.
Specifically...as the mainstay of a nation, (Quebec) 
wants free rein to make its own decisions affecting the 
growth of its citizens as human beings...their economic 
development...their cultural fulfilment...and the pre­
sence abroad of the Quebec community.
To this end, the new Quebec government is committed 
to the fundamental task of obtaining legal and poli­
tical recognition of the French Canadian nation... 
(Statement: Tax Structure Committee, 19&6, p. 2-3).
...As French speaking Canadians, we have the unshakable 
conviction that we form a viable community sharing one 
of the greatest cultures in the western world, speaking 
an int e m a t  i onal language and endowed with vast human 
potentialities. That is why, despite all difficulties, 
we are resolved to preserve our identity.,.(Preliminary 
Statement: Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, 1^67,
pTTT
La survivance thus lies behind one of Quebec's prime poli­
tical objectives, decentralization. Each successive Quebec 
government since 1867 has remained "consistently attached to 
a strict federalism as a protector of its own culture and the 
cultural dualism of Canada. (Each) has been the chief cita­
del of resistance to centralizing conceptions and homogeni­
zing tendencies" (Brady, in Meekison, p. 338).
While, historically, Quebec has always sought to guard 
its domestic provincial autonomy against federal encroach­
ments, external affairs is presently in the foreground of 
that vigil. The age of technique has altered the content and 
conduct of international relations and these changes, in turn.
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affect not only Canadian federal-provincial relations, but 
threaten as well la survivance.
Increasingly, since the second world war, international 
relations has shifted its focus in terms of subject matter. 
More and more it deals with topics which, in Canada's case, 
are assigned to provincial jurisdiction - education, culture, 
labour, health, etc. - and if the federal government were to 
ignore this large and growing sector of international acti­
vities, Canada would be harnessed with an ever-narrowing 
external role. Those benefits which co-operation and mutual 
development bring, would no doubt be lost. Yet, if the 
federal government were to treat all international activities, 
including these, as matters of its own exclusive jurisdiction, 
it could not help but reshape, if only by influence, the 
domestic distribution of powers and thus the federal structure, 
From a constitutional point of view, and within the context of 
Quebec's devotion to decentralization (or the minimum objec- 
tive of strict federalism), this is totally unacceptable:
...Le fait...que les relations extérieures aient été 
généralement confiées au gouvernement central à l'époque 
ou ces relations ne se rapportaient qu'à la paix et à 
la guerre ou aux échanges commerciaux ne veut pas dire 
grand'chose aujourd'hui, alors que ces relations con­
cernent de plus en plus l'éducation, la culture et les 
affaires sociales...(Document de Travail, 1969, p. 34).
...Now most of these sectors are a provincial responsi- 
bility, and Quebec obviously cannot allow them to be 
dealt with internationally by the federal government 
alone. The content of agreements in these fields has 
such a close bearing on the implementation of day-to- 
day policies that, if the federal government were to 
have a monopoly on international affairs, it would 
gradually take over de facto - if not de jure - internal 
jurisdiction over matters which constitutionally, do
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not fall within its competence...(Brief on the Con­
stitution, 1968, p. 14).
It is all the more unacceptable when consideration is 
given to the inefficient and artificial nature of boundaries 
within the modern world. If technology, through the crea­
tion of vast new networks of communications, has webbed more 
intricately the relations among governments and peoples, it 
has also, by the same means, facilitated informal penetra­
tion. Technology has fostered the proliferation of inter­
national actors and agents, and has provided all with some 
degree of informal access. Thus, in a period of increasing 
informal access, as the traditional lines between states be­
come more blurred and as the controls of movement across and 
within boundaries become more difficult,
...a situation sometimes develops in which the critical 
boundary may not be the geographical one but one de­
fined by the circumstances of the market, the location 
of the adherents of an opposing ideology, the location 
of a given race or religious group, (etc.)...(Scott,
1965, p. 168).
This, precisely, is Quebec's argument; that the geo­
graphical boundary is now irrelevant. Instead, the critical 
line of demarcation follows closely the subject-matters of
jurisdictional competence, for, in the modern world, exter-
9
nal-internal dichotomies are inapplicable .
9 The inextricable relationship between external and 
domestic affairs is often used to support Quebec's inter- 
national ambitions. Since both jurisdictions share one and 
the same boundary (however tenuous that line may be), to 
affect one is necessarily to affect the other. Jean-Marc 
Leger repeatedly points this out;
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The salience of such arguments for Quebec is reinforced
by their dual nature; the boundary of exclusive jurisdic­
tion for the government of Quebec coincides with the equally 
critical boundary of the cultural-national community. Strict 
federalism is one means to survival. Not only must the fe- 
deral government cease to encompass provincial areas on the 
international plane, but it must also cease to represent, or 
to speak on behalf of, French Canada abroad. As so many
Quebec governments have stated, Quebec - not Ottawa - is the
10
mainstay of the French Canadian community .
This latter assertion stems from both historical and 
current developments whereby French Canadians ended their 
"long search for a fatherland" (Brunet in Russell, p. 47-60). 
During the Quiet Revolution Québécois particularly identified
...La frontière est d'ailleurs de plus en plus tenue 
entre ce qui appartient au domaine intérieur et ce qui 
relève de la politique étrangère; celle-ci tend à 
n'être pas seulement un prolongement mais un élément 
de la politique intérieure et, dans le cas des fédéra­
tions, risque d'être un puissant instrument de centra­
lisation. ..(Le Devoir, 23 juin I967, p. 4).
...A une époque où la frontière est imprécise, sinon 
inexistante, entre "affaires internes" et "affaires 
internationales", l'exercice réel des compétences 
attachées h l'autonomie suppose la prolongation de ces 
compétences sur le plan extérieur; autrement, 1'auto­
nomie interne elle-méme ne tarde pas a l^bre affaiblie 
et, bientôt, menacée...(Le Devoir, 4 octobre I968, p. 4)
10 The distinction between French Canada and Quebec "may 
seem pedantic, but it is most assuredly not. It is, indeed, 
the very essence of the current debate..." (Cook, 19^1, p. 
70). Ramsay Cook touches on this debate throughout two 
chapters, "French Canada and Confederation; The Quest for 
Equality" and "Quebec; Federalism or Independence?" (1971» 
p. 68-81 and p. 82-98 respectively).
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themselves increasingly with the state of Quebec as the sole
provider of French Canadian opportunities on a non-discrimi- 
natory basis. Ottawa was left as the capital of English 
Canada. Quebec's nationalist historians point to the rep- 
resentation of French Canadians in federal employment stati- 
stics and percentages, and to the historical pro-English 
performance of the central government (especially in times of 
crisis) as having rendered Ottawa ineligible for that leader­
ship role. Indeed, the Preliminary Report of the Royal Com- 
raission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism confirmed this 
lack of identification by French Canadians with Ottawa;
...Our first contacts with French-speaking Canada did 
not reveal anything we had not anticipated, unless it 
was the extreme suspicion with which a large part of 
Quebec looks on anything that is initiated by Ottawa, 
and its considerable scepticism as to English Canada's 
ability and desire to understand French Canada. Some 
sàid irritably: "We have been submitting our claims
for thirty, fifty and even a hundred years, and there 
have never been any results - why should we begin again 
now?" (p. 28).
The force of such popular historical interpretations - inter­
pretations which successive Quebec leaders have not been re­
luctant to accept - thus granted to the government of Quebec, 
the duty of ensuring and providing for the growth and ful- 
filment of the French Canadian collectivity.
In this light, the denial of a federal role is at once 
an assertion that Quebec, in the exercise of its full legis- 
lative competence, be the single, direct and legitimate 
spokesman for that cultural-national community. Demands for 
a "special status" at home have thereby become claims for a
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"special status" abroad;
...if Quebec is the prime political structure for French 
Canada's destiny, there is no reason by this province's 
government should not assume international responsibi­
lities to the extent that external factors may affect 
its destiny...(Painchaud in Clarkson, p. 86).
And, as it is argued, if this should be the case gene­
rally, it should most certainly be the rule where cultural-
11
national life-lines are concerned ;
...jamais nous ne lâcherons quand il s'agit de relations 
dans le domaine de l'éducation et, particulièrement, 
avec la francophonie, car nous ne voulons pas laisser 
à Ottawa...le contrôle de l'oxygène francophone dont 
nous avons besoin pour vivre...(Daniel Johnson; Le 
Devoir, 26 septembre 1968, p. 2) 12
11 Claude Ryan, in an editorial (Le Devoir, 14 septembre
1968), puts forth this exact case;
...Le gouvernement du Québec, en raison de la composi­
tion de sa population et de,l'histoire même du dernier
siècle, a une responsabilité toute spéciale à l'endroit
de l'épanouissement de la vie française en Amérique du 
Nord. Chargé de responsabilités exclusives dans des 
domaines aussi vitaux que l'éducation, le bien-être, 
les relations de travail, la justice, le^développement 
économique et social, il éprouve spontanément, dès qu'il 
veut respirer, le besoin d'être en rapport avec le pays 
qui incarne par excellence la vie française. Il veut 
pouvoir communiquer directement avec ce pays. Il lui 
répugne de devoir se prêter, dans le développement de 
ces rapports, à la surveillance jalouse d'une belle- 
mère, meme si celle-ci est très bien disposée...(p. 4).
12 Bertrand has made a similar assertion. In the Document 
de Travail (p. 10), the Quebec government submits that, parti­
cularly in the field of education (and education plays a 
large part in Quebec's external relations), only the provin­
cial government can effect competent international agreements;
...le gouvernement du Québec doit y être directement 
partie et...il ne peut accepter d'y participer par 
l'intermédiaire du gouvernement fédéral. Tous ces 
échanges exigent une connaissance intime de 1 'appareil 
gouvernemental et des institutions d'enseignement. Il 
s'agit d'abord d 'évaluer les besoins, puis de fixer des 
priorités et, pour cela, d'engager des discussions avec 
les ministères et les institutions d'enseignement; il 
faut ensuite negoçier le tout, annuellement, avec les
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While Quebec was demanding the recognition of its right
as sole spokesman for the French Canadian community, and 
while it argued for various forms of "special status" at 
home and abroad, it became increasingly important for that 
government to exercise more fully that right. In the post­
war years - when the evolution of political thought was 
firmly establishing the Quebec state as a point of political 
reference for French Canadians, when the Quiet Revolution 
was re-defining la survivance, when demands for full legis­
lative competence were making "special status" more attrac- 
tive, when the content of international relations was touching 
more closely upon the nerves of provincial jurisdiction - 
in the midst of all these activities, the relationship be- 
tween la survivance and Quebec's need to engage in external 
relations became increasingly apparent. The same technology 
which had opened the world to Quebec had simultaneously opened 
Quebec to the world, and specifically to its North American 
English-speaking environment.
Immediately, a variety of implications became evident to 
Québécois* sociologically, their traditional protective way 
of life was disintegrating; demographioally, they comprised 
a tiny group in comparison with the North American English- 
speaking community; economically, their industrial society, 
created by aliens, reflected none of their own particular
autorités françaises; il faut enfin pourvoir aux dé­
penses et évaluer les résultats. Or, seul le gouverne­
ment du Québec est compétent, en droit et en fait, pour 
remplir cette tâche...
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cultural values; and politically, the 186? constitution did
not grant the protection they had long anticipated. Premier
Johnson, in reviewing these "obstacles to full self-achieve-
ment", was, perhaps correctly, pessimistic;
...our nation no longer has a choice. If it passively 
accepts the present situation, it will inevitably take 
the road to slow but sure assimilation into the great 
North American mass...(Preliminary Statement; Confedera- 
of Tomorrow Conference, 1967, p« 4-5)*
Given its numerical size and the relative strength of 
its economy, the French Canadian community could never hope 
to maintain its position within, let alone dominate, the 
patterns of North American cultural communications. La sur­
vivance demanded cultural reinforcement. External relations 
thus became politically an objective, culturally an imperative, 
Several papers presented at the Montreal conference of Les 
Etats-Généraux make this quite clear;
...French Canadians are and will be more and more sub­
mitted to massive influence from the United States in 
every respect of their life, their work, their thought. 
From this it follows that prompt and rapid development 
of close relationships with other French-speaking coun­
tries is an urgent necessity...
...it is no exaggeration to affirm that the entry of 
French Canada into the Francophone world has become a 
fundamental condition, a sine qua non, of survival. 
Yesterday, this could have been regarded simply as 
desirable or useful; today, it is necessary, it is 
vitally desirable...
...it is necessary also to revive our cultural heritage 
and to restore our language, and to open ourselves in
French to the modern world...(in Morrison, p. 22-23)•
This cultural imperative has strongly conditioned the 
behaviour of Quebec governments in the 1960's, particularly
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strative responsibilities, whether those responsibilities lay 
in the domestic or in the external domain. The international 
relations of Quebec can certainly be seen in this light. It 
is an attempt to institutionalize and, in the federal-provin- 
cial arena, to regularize Quebec's spacial transmission of 
French Canadian culture; it is an attempt to secure a much 
needed, much desired cultural reinforcement by co-operation 
and in association not only with the cultural motherland 
France, but also with other less-developed francophone socie­
ties. To Quebec, it is a question of breaking out of its 
previously self-imposed isolation wherein stagnation and assi­
milation are inevitably perceived; it is a question of extro­
version, modernization and societal self-development (l'épa­
nouissement) while preserving and developing all that is 
culturally valuable.
In defence of Quebec's international role, French Cana­
dian advocates have employed Canadian political, technological
and cultural arguments. Those used by Daniel Johnson, the
13
most ardent and flamboyant advocate, combine all three :
...II n'y a pas d'égalité possible pour la communauté 
française au Canada si le Québec ne peut pas negoçier 
librement les accords nécessaires à la preservation de
13 The speeches of Liberal Paul Gerin-Lajoie and of the 
Union Nationale's Marcel Masse express strikingly similar 
sentiments;  ^ ^
...De plus, dans un monde où les frontières existent de 
moins en moins, il est évident que notre épanouissement 
social et culturel exige que nous exprimions nous-mémes 
sur le plan international, que nous développions des 
contacts et des échanges, que nous nous donnions des
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son heritage particulier.^ II n'y a pas d'égalité pos­
sible pour une communauté nationale,qui se trouve placée 
sous la dépendance d'une autre^dans les domaines qui 
mettent en jeu son existence même...Dans le passé le 
Québec a pu préserver son heritage culturel grâce k 
isolement relatif. Cet isolement n'est plus possible 
aujourd'hui. Le temps est venu pour nous de nouer des 
contacts beaucoup plus étroits avec la France et les 
autres pays francophones du monde. Ce n'est pas un 
caprice juridique, c'est^un nécessite vitale...La nation 
n'est pas un cercle ferme...C'est une communauté de 
langue et de culture qui est ouverte par conséquent a 
tous ceux qui ont part à cette langue et à cette culture, 
quelle soit leur origine ethnique...(Le Devoir, 26 juin
1967, p. 1-2).
In addition, Louis Sabourin, keeping in mind the close re­
lationship between Quebec's culture and its economy, adds the 
following economically-oriented reasoning:
dimensions nouvelles, des possibilités d'action plus 
étendues tant sur le plan individuel que collectif.
Pour protéger notre identité québécoise et canadienne- 
française, nous nous sommes autrefois repliés sur nous- 
mâmes. Pour l'épanouir, il nous faut aujourd'hui nous 
ouvrir sur le monde...(Gerin-Lajoie; Débats, 13 avril
1967, p. 2176).
...Mais dans ce monde qui marche irrémédiablement vers 
l'unité d'action, il demeure quand même indispensable 
de sauvegarder les particularismes, principalement d' 
ordre culturel et sociologique^ qui forment l'une des 
grandes richesses de 1 'humanité. Voilà pourquoi aucun 
peuple et, c'est le cas du peuple québécois, ne peut 
s'en remettre entièrement pour l'image qu'on projette 
de lui à l'extérieur à une autorité qui n'a jamais su 
le refléter fidèlement dans so% essence et dans ses 
caractéristiques propres. Les Etats fédératifs sont sou- 
vent crées dans le but de protéger la diversité cultu- 
relle de leurs habitants. Mais l'expérience du passé, 
en ce qui nous concerne, nous indique clairement que la 
communauté québécoise doit avoir certaines fenêtres sur 
le monde extérieur pour s'acquitter de toutes ses 
obligations internes et pour assurer son épanouissement, 
même si elle ne jouit pas de la souveraineté complète 
...(Le Devoir, 23 juin I967, p. 3).
This latter statement by Masse is part of a speech, the text 
of which may be found in Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 2, 
no. 3, p. 40-45.
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...the government (of Quebec) must make sure that the 
million and a half young people who will look for jobs 
in the next fifteen years will be able to work in 
their language. Most private corporations are not yet 
able to create a French-speaking milieu de travail for 
they import most of their scientific know-how from the 
United States and English Canada. It is then up to the 
government of Quebec to try to counter-balance such a 
trend. The only way to do so is to establish more ex­
changes with French-speaking countries which can pro­
vide such scientific and technical knowledge...(in 
Clarkson, p. 100),
Nevertheless, whatever arguments are brought to bear -
whether cultural, political, legal, technological, or eco­
nomic - the issue itself has evolved from one of "institu­
tionalization" to one of "legitimization". The external 
activities of Quebec, particularly from 1965 onward, have 
placed that government firmly on the international scene.
The Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, numerous cul­
tural, economic, educational and technical programmes of 
co-operation, and Quebec's participation on several inter­
national or intergovernmental bodies and commissions, have 
virtually assured Quebec an international role in practice, 
if not in theory.
What remains to be settled is a question of degree, both 
in the quantity and in the quality of Quebec's international 
relations. Given the fluid nature of Quebec provincial and 
Canadian federal politics, it is a question which may con­
ceivably never be answered, but for which in the continuing 
constitutional conference, and in day-to-day federal-pro­
vincial relations, a solution is constantly being sought.
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CONCLUSION
Preservation of the French Canadian culture and nation 
has been, historically, a prime concern. Since the Conquest 
and for almost two centuries thereafter, the French Canadian 
Catholic Church has been, by virtue of its dominant position 
in Quebec's society, the receptacle of this culture and thus 
the guarantor of national survival. Language, culture, laws, 
general customs and ecclesiastical principles were freely 
interwoven by the Church to form the ideology of survival. 
Defensive isolation was the keystone. The state was an 
insignificant actor, for, with the Church ("the mother- 
institution of public institutions") serving as cultural re­
pository, there was no necessity for interventional assis­
tance; nor was the political climate appropriate, given 
Quebec's general conservative nature, for the state to 
assume a positive role.
The urbanization and accompanying secularization of
Quebec altered this pattern. It was particularly under the
accelerated technological advances of post-war Quebec that
the power and relevance of the Church rapidly dissipated,
and, in part by its own acquiescance, in part by public 
1 2 
pressure , the Church gradually withdrew from many
1 Mason Wade wrote in the mid-1950's of this growing pub­
lic pressure *
...All French Canadians are conscious of the great debt 
they owe to their clergy for ensuring cultural survival 
in the post-conquest period, though there is a growing
—  98 “
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nonecolesiastioal, societal functions.
In the critical area of cultural-national preservation, 
the state assumed the leading role. But the methods by 
which the state government attempted to sustain cultural- 
national integrity were not those of the Church. A twentieth 
century approach to the twentieth century technologically- 
inspired assimilative threats was needed. Defensive tactics 
of cultural isolation were now inapplicable, and the finan­
cial, administrative and moral supports of the state were
given to an extroverted development encompassing all areas
3
of provincial jurisdiction s
group today who feel that this debt has been abundantly 
repaid and that the clergy should abandon many of their 
traditional activities now that there are plenty of 
trained laymen available to fulfil these nonclerical 
functions...(in Park, p. 369).
2 The Church's withdrawal was certainly not total, nor 
did the state seek to exclude it completely. Left-right and 
seoular-sacral debates throughout the hierarchical structure 
of the Church (although more noticeable amongst the lower 
ranks of young clerics) contributed to its "hesitant and 
divided" nature (Corbett, p. 4), and thus to its relegation 
to one aspect of the larger politico-socio-economic complex. 
At the same time, and for the first time, a great and grow­
ing number of the lay middle class is concerned about cul­
tural issues and are pursuing solutions beyond the aegis of 
that Church. This is no more than the natural functioning
of a pluralist society.
The Church, however, is still a societal participant, 
directing its present attentions more towards the field of 
social action. For a current examination of the Church today 
and of its "thorough-going metamorphosis", see Norbert 
Lacoste, "A Mobile Church for a Mobile People" in Mann, vol.
1, p. 295-301.
3 The means of course changed with the ends; as la survi­
vance was re-defined, so were government policies. The 
Premiership of Jean Lesage was the first where government 
policies issued in large part frwn the Quiet Revolution. He 
wrote of the attitudinal change toward cultural-national
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...nous devons non seulement sauvegarder notre identité 
ethnique, mais nous devons trouver les moyens qui per­
mettront à notre langue et à notre culture de s'épanouir 
...nous croyons que la cause de l'avancement de notre 
minorité nationale dans tous les domaines ne sera bien 
servie^que si le gouvernement du Québec - la seule pro­
vince à prédominance canadienne-française - adopte ce 
que j'appellerais une politique globale, en ne négli­
geant de cette façon aucun des domaines d'activité 
capables de favoriser l'épanouissement économique, so­
cial et culturel de notre groupe ethnique...(Un Québec 
Fort, p. 15-16).
The placing of education Under state control was only 
an initial step towards 1'épanouissement des Québécois. It 
did not per se ensure cultural development and enrichment, 
for the sources of French cultural strength lay beyond the 
borders of Quebec and beyond the borders of Canada and Eng- 
lish-speaking North America. By the same technological means 
which permitted the anglophone Culture to converge on Quebec, 
Quebec in turn, could reach cultural allies. Inter-societal 
cultural transmission was a sine qua non for l'épanouisse­
ment, and Quebec thus sought to establish relations (parti­
cularly and initially in the cultural-educational fields) 
with francophone societies abroad.
survival, that attitudinal change which formed the basis of 
his government's approach :
...il n'est pas question de survivre, mais de VIVREi Et 
vivre, c'est lutter...
...La population québécoise^vivait jadis dans l'isole­
ment, dans son petit monde a elle et dans le sentiment 
que "le Canada" s'arrêtait aux frontières de sa pro- 
vince; aujourd'hui, la province est ouverte sur le 
reste du pays et le reste du monde...Plus que jamais, 
elle tient à ses caractères propres, à sa culture, sa  ^
langue et sa religion. D'une manière, elle s'est engagée 
dans un processus d'affirmation de soi pour laquelle 
elle entend vivre désormais comme un peuple adulte dans 
un monde de nations souveraines,..la population du Qué­
bec ne veut plus se contenter d'être la gardienne de 
cette culture : elle veut en devenir le symbole vivant 
...(Un Québec Fort, p. 10-11).
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Naturally, France held a fundamental position within 
this framework. It was the cultural fountainhead; its 
schools, its economy, its literati were all well established; 
they enjoyed a considerable reputation. Consequently, France 
provided the much-needed initial francophone reinforcement.
Nevertheless, as early as I96I, Francophone Africa was 
viewed as an important factor in the self-definition of 
Québécois. Relations with these newly independent states 
would offer cultural stimulation and strength, and would 
provide "la chance de faire connaître notre culture par les 
autres" (Un Québec Fort, p. I3)• Most important, however, 
was that opportunity which Francophone Africa afforded Que­
bec *
...l'élément français du Canada peut, s'il le veut, 
devenir un important trait d'union entre les pays oc­
cidentaux et ceux qui appartiennent à ce que nous 
appelons le tiers-monde. Un grand nombre de ces pays 
sont d'expression française - je pense ici aux nouveaux 
Ëtats d'Afrique - et ils ont besoin de 1'appui culturel 
qt technique du Canada français. Tous ces nouveaux 
Etats ne partagent pas le même degré d'industrialisa­
tion et le même niveau de vie, mais tous, à cause de 
leur situation nouvelle et à^cause de leur indépendance 
récente, sentent la nécessité de frôler les coudes des 
nations qui peuvent les comprendre. Il est indéniable 
que le Canada français appartient a ce groupe...(Un 
Québec Fort, p. 13)•
Francophone Africa provided Quebec with the opportunity to
make an original contribution to the human race. In so doing.
Francophone Africa provided a raison d'etre.
Given the new and acute assimilative threats of the 
technological age, given the redefinition of the means and
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ends of cultural-national survival, and given the govern-
4
ment*8 determination to pursue on its own , in all ways, the 
achievement of those means and ends, it was inevitable that 
Quebec should seek to institutionalize not only the temporal 
transmission, but the spacial transmission of culture as 
well. The attempt to effect an international role was the 
logical next-step in the government's drive to develop Que­
bec society, culturally and economically, by exercising 
fully its legislative and administrative prerogatives. 
Changes in the content and conduct of international rela­
tions, and the virtual silence of the British North America 
Act specifically on external affairs, facilitated this step 
and provided Quebec with some basis for argumentation.
Throughout the 1960's, but particularly from 1965-1970, 
the government of Quebec made increasingly frequent forrays 
into the external arena and there sought to establish pro­
grammes of co-operation and exchange with other French- 
speaking states. To date, thousands of Québécois have parti­
cipated in such programmes; several hundred others have
5
served on the administrative commissions and bodies . Quebec
4 Jean Lesage, in his speeches, often spoke of the neces­
sity for Quebec to count only on itself i
...il y a un accord complet quant k la nécessité pour
la population du Québec de compter sur elle-même si elle
veut voir ses espoirs et ses aspirations réalisés pleine, 
ment et convenablement...Dans la découverte et dans 
l'application de ces moyens (de nous épanouir), nous 
faisons face à des problèmes qui nous sont propres et 
nous savons qu'en dernière analyse, c'est presque tou­
jours par nos propres énergies que nous les résoudrons. 
Dans ce domaine, nous voulons surtout nous aider nous-
mêmes ...(Un Québec Fort, p. 12 and p. 15).
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operates three Deïégations-Générales (New York, London and 
Paris), six Bureaux économiques (Milan, Chicago, Boston, 
Dallas, Los Angeles, Dusseldorf), and a Mission permanent 
pour le Quebec en Louisiane. The creation in I967 of the 
Department of Intergovernmental Affairs signaled, for all 
provincial purposes, the institutionalization of the inter­
national relations of Quebec. Thereafter, Quebec's external 
activities were co-ordinated and controlled by one central, 
administrative agency.
The quantity and scope of Quebec's international acti­
vities seem to have assured that province of an international 
role. Indeed, its degree of involvement on the international 
plane presents a considerable barrier to the path of retreat. 
Furthermore, the continued allocation of monies, the employ­
ment of manpower and the creation of administrative bodies 
speak themselves of a certain determination in policy whereby 
Quebec is resolved to maintain transnational relations.
Such factors lead one to the conclusion that the inter- 
national relations of Quebec is a permanent feature on the 
Canadian scene. In this sense, it is institutionalized. More- 
over, because those relations deal largely with cultural, 
educational, and socio-economic affairs, and because they are
5 Chapter II of the Document de Travail (p. 6-13) gives 
an overall picture,of Quebec's international involvement up 
to February 1969* Etudes Internationales, a quarterly publi­
cation of the Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 
provides current documentation of the int ernational rela- 
tions of Quebec.
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conducted within a francophone framework, one can also speak 
of Quebec's institutionalization of the spacial transmission 
of culture.
In terms of federal-provincial relations, what was 
originally a bitter and controversial issue has become more 
long-term and thus low-key. The international relations of
Quebec is presently a political reality; its existence is
6
no longer at stake . Instead, the debate has shifted in­
creasingly to one of a mutually-acceptable legitimization, 
and its forum has become the constitutional conference.
Here, both the standardization (or institutionalization)
of Quebec's relations and the intervention of short-term
7
political phenomena account for the issue's less-than- 
urgent priority. In fact, at the most recent constitutional 
conference in Victoria, June 1971, the focus was on social 
welfare. Neither in the final communiqué, nor in the consti­
tutional charter, was external affairs discussed (Le Devoir,g—
18 juin 1971, p. 5; and 19 juin 1971, p. 9 respectively) .
6 Marcel Cadieux, a prominent federal figure (formerly 
Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and now Cana­
dian Ambassador to the United States), holds this very
opinion :
...Quebec's presence on the world scene is, I believe, 
not merely a fact; it is an obvious fact. That Quebec 
must be more active on that scene also appears obvious 
to me. The real problem is how Quebec is to play its
role in the world...(in Meekison, p. 379)•
7 The polarized Quebec election of April 1970, the FLQ 
crisis in the fall, and the general unhealthy state of the 
Canadian economy all made great demands on both federal and 
provincial governments.
8 According to Claude Lemelin, however, there were rumours
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Perhaps a more important factor has been "de-symboliza~ 
tion". The election of Robert Bourassa effected a change in 
emphasis and style. Economic and fiscal questions were given 
top priority, and federal advantages stressed. The quest for 
governmental symbols as ends in themselves - a quest which 
seemed to characterize the Ottawa-Quebec dispute in the 
1960*8 - was "consciously downplayed" (McWhinney in Con- 
federation Challenge, vol. 2, p. I4l).
All these factors have combined to defuse what was once 
an explosive issue. Together, they account for the relatively 
more pragmatic approach being taken by both Ottawa and Que- 
bec. But, while the issue of Quebec's international rela­
tions may have been relegated to a longer-term, lower-key 
concern, it remains nevertheless without a solution. It is 
unlikely that the federal government will concede to Quebec 
the rights to represent itself and to negotiate and sign 
agreements on its own initiative, in all matters of provin­
cial jurisdiction. It is equally unlikely that Quebec will 
concede to the federal government an exclusive jurisdiction 
in international affairs. There is, of course, a myriad of 
compromise positions and the attainment of the most suitable 
may involve a much lengthier process of negotiation than is 
presently envisaged.
that the federal government would submit a text calling for 
the recognition of its exclusive competence in international 
affairs (Le Devoir, 11 juin 1971, p. 4). Such a text did not 
appear.
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